M. A. G. Osmani - The One Two Punch

The One Two Punch

The failure of the so-called monsoon offensive caused Bangladesh forces high command to rethink their strategy. Since the Bengali regular brigades (Z,K and S forces) were not ready to liberate and hold a lodgement area on their own, and there were several issues with the ongoing gureeilla campaign, it was clear a long struggle awaited the Bangladeshi resistance which could be cut short with a direct Indian military intervention – which was still uncertain. Several factors changed prior to Bangladesh High Command implementing the next strategy.

• The uncertainty over Indian involvement changed – after a meeting between Indian and Bangladesh Prime ministers in October it became clear India was likely to intervene sometime between December 1971 and April 1972.
• The Indian –Soviet Friendship pact assures India of superpower support – and enhanced Indian capability to supply the Mukti bahini as Russia began to send their WWII vintage surplus weapons to India.
• The Indian Army Eastern Command began to improve their logistical network from July 1971, which also enabled getting supplies to the Mukti Bahini easier. Major General B.N. Sarkar of Indian army began coordinating the war objectives for Mukti Bahini after consulting with Indian and Bengali officers on the ground and Bangladesh Forces HQ, and distribute the same set of objectives monthly to all concerned. This eliminated the misunderstandings and coordination problems between the Mukti Bahini and the Indian army to a large degree.
• At the beginning of the war Indian authorities officially endorsed only Awami League affiliated volunteer training, after the Soviet-Indian friendship pact for security reasons as India had security issues with some of their domestic left parties activities. After the Soviet-Indian pact, Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed opened up recruitment to all comers.

Initially, General Osmani thought about dismantling the regular battalions operating under Z, K and S forces and sending platoons from these forces to aid the guerrillas. His associates advised against this and he ultimately let them be, but deployed the Z force battalions separately to aid guerrilla actions around Sylhet. It was decided to senr at least 20,000 trained guerrillas into Bangladesh from September onwards. If even 1/3 of the force succeeded in it’ objective, the effect on the Pakistani forces would be devastating.