Luding Bridge - Lin Biao's Role in The Assault

Lin Biao's Role in The Assault

Lin Biao has commonly been given credit for direct command of the assault. However, the actual commander was the regimental political commissar Yang Chengwu. Lin Biao and other column commanders remained at their temporary headquarters 160 km away from Luding Bridge, and the task of taking the bridge was given to Lin Biao's vanguard unit, the 4th regiment, as it was 40 km closer to Luding. The regiment was led by commander Wang Kaixiang (王开湘) and political commissar Yang Chengwu (杨成武). Credit was publicly given to Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution, in which he was glorified to boost his popularity. Giving him direct credit for jobs accomplished by his subordinates was one of the standard propaganda techniques. During the Cultural Revolution, the actual commander, Yang Chengwu (杨成武) was jailed and persecuted under the direct order of Lin Biao.

The actual decision to capture Luding Bridge was made by Mao Zedong himself, at noon on May 26, 1935, with the help of Zhu De. When Mao and Zhu reached Anshunchang ferry, they found just four small boats. After moving a regiment across the river with the ferry, it became apparent that transporting the entire Red Army by ferry would take at least a month. Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist force, commanded by Xue Yue, was closing in fast, so it was decided that the main force would cross the Dadu River at Luding Bridge, 160 km upstream.

Mao decided that the Red Army would launch a two-pronged attack on Luding Bridge:

• The main force would be on the western bank of Dadu River. This was Lin Biao's 2nd division, spearheaded by the commander Wang Kaixiang (王开湘)'s and political commissar Yang Chengwu (杨成武)'s 4th regiment, 2nd division, 1st Chinese Red Army corps.

• On the eastern bank of the Dadu river would be the 1st division, personally led by the Chinese Red Army chief-of-the-general-staff, Liu Bocheng, and the political commissar of the 1st Corps, Nie Rongzhen. They were spearheaded by commander Yang Dezhi (杨得志)'s and political commissar Li Lin (黎林)'s the 1st regiment, 1st division, 1st Chinese Red Army corps.

Mao had also prepared for the worst: if the two forces could not meet at Luding Bridge, Liu Bocheng and Nie Rongzhen would move into western Sichuan and there set up a new base.

Lin Biao had little to do with the planning or the direct battle maneuvers of the event. He probably provided logistical implementation for Mao's orders, and then dispatched his units to follow the plan. Lin Biao himself did not reach Luding Bridge until May 30, 1935, well after the end of the battle. Even Liu Bocheng reached Luding Bridge during the night of May 29, 1935, earlier than Lin Biao. However, Lin Biao can be credited with having the audacity, even recklessness, to order his troops to quickly march 160 km in 24 hours through hostile territory, and then, without rest, fight against an enemy of unknown strength.