July Crisis - Serbian Response To The Ultimatum

Serbian Response To The Ultimatum

On the night of July 23, the Serbian Regent, Crown Prince Alexander, visited the Russian legation to "express his despair over the Austrian ultimatum, compliance with which he regards as an absolute impossibility for a state which had the slightest regard for its dignity". Both the Regent and Pašić asked for Russian support, which was refused. Sazonov offered the Serbs only moral support while Nicholas told the Serbs to simply accept the ultimatum, and hope that international opinion would force the Austrians to change their minds. Both Russia and France, because of their military weaknesses, were most disinclined to risk a war with Germany in 1914, and hence the pressure on Serbia to accede to the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Because the Austrians had repeatedly promised the Russians that nothing was planned against Serbia that summer, their harsh ultimatum did not do much to antagonize Sazonov.

Confronted with the ultimatum and the lack of support from other European powers, the Serbian Cabinet worked out a compromise where Serbia accepted all of the terms of the ultimatum except for the demand in point #6 that Austrian police be allowed to operate in Serbia. The German shipping tycoon Albert Ballin recalled that when the German government heard a misleading report that Serbia had accepted the ultimatum, there was “disappointment”, but “tremendous joy” when it learned that the Serbs had not accepted all of the Austrian terms. When Ballin suggested Wilhelm end his North Sea cruise to deal with the crisis, the German Foreign Ministry flatly stated the Emperor should continue his cruise because “...everything must be done to ensure that he does not interfere in things with his pacifist ideas.” At the same time, a message was sent to Berchtold from his ambassador in Berlin reminding him “Here every delay in the beginning of war operations is regarded as signifying the danger that foreign powers might interfere. We are urgently advised to proceed without delay.”

In a letter to his close friend, Venetia Stanley, the British Prime Minister Sir Herbert Asquith wrote:

"…the situation is just about bad as it can possibly be. Austria has sent a bullying and humiliating ultimatum to Serbia, who cannot possibly comply with it, and demanded an answer within forty-eight hours-failing which she will march. This means, almost inevitably, that Russia will come to the scene in defence of Serbia and in defiance of Austria, and if so, it is difficult for Germany and France to refrain from lending a hand to one side or the other. So that we are in measurable, or imaginable, distance of a real Armageddon. Happily, there seems to be no reason why we should be anything more then spectators."

The First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, wrote, “Europe is trembling on the verge of a general war. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia being the most insolent document of its kind ever devised,” but believed that Britain would stay neutral in the coming war. Grey suggested to the Austrian ambassador that the deadline for the ultimatum be extended as the best way of saving the peace.

When Grey told his friend Lichnowsky that "Any nation that accepted conditions like that would really cease to count as an independent nation", Wilhelm wrote on the margin of Lichnowsky’s report “That would be very desirable. It is not a nation in the European sense, but a band of robbers!”

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov sent a message to all of the great powers asking them to pressure Austria to extend the deadline of the ultimatum. Sazonov asked the Austrian government to back its claims of Serbian complicity in killing of Franz Ferdinand by releasing the results of its official inquiry, which the Austrians refused to do as they lacked such conclusive as opposed to circumstantial evidence. Several times, the Austrians refused Russian requests to extend the deadline, despite warnings that an Austro-Serbian war could easily cause a world war. Sazonov told the Austrian ambassador “I know what it is. You mean to make war on Serbia...? You are setting fire to Europe.... Why was Serbia given no chance to speak and why the form of an ultimatum? The fact is you mean war and you have burnt your bridges.... One sees how peace-loving you are.”

On July 24, the Russian Council of Ministers met to decide their response to the crisis. The Russian Agriculture Minister Alexander Krivoshein, who was especially trusted by Nicholas, noted that:

"…our rearmament programme had not been completed and it seemed doubtful whether our Army and Fleet would ever be able to compete with those of Germany and Austria-Hungary as regards modern technical efficiency…No one in Russia desired a war. The disastrous consequences of the Russo-Japanese War had shown the grave danger which Russia would run in case of hostilities. Consequently our policy should aim at reducing the possibility of a European war, but if we remained passive we would attain our objectives…In his view stronger language than we had used hitherto was desirable."

Sazonov stated that Russia had usually been moderate in its foreign policy, but “Germany looked upon our concessions as so many proofs of our weakness and far from having prevented our neighbours from using aggressive methods, we had encouraged them.” The Russian War Minister Marshal Vladimir Sukhomlinov and the Navy Minister Admiral Ivan Grigorovich stated that Russia was not ready for a war against either Austria or Germany, but that “…hesitation was no longer appropriate as far as the Imperial government was concerned. They saw no objection to a display of greater firmness in our diplomatic negotiations”. The Russian government again asked Austria to extend the deadline, and advised to the Serbs to offer as little resistance as possible to the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Finally to deter Austria from war, the Russian Council of Ministers ordered a partial mobilization against Austria.

Russian policy was to pressure the Serbs to accept the ultimatum as much as possible without being humiliated too much. Russia was most anxious to avoid a war because the Great Military Programme was not to be completed until 1917, and Russia was otherwise not ready for war. Because all of France’s leaders, including President Poincaré and René Viviani, were at sea on the battleship France, returning from the summit in St. Petersburg, the acting head of the French government, Jean-Baptiste Bienvenu-Martin took no line on the ultimatum. In addition, the Germans jammed the radio messages, blocking all contact from the ship-borne French leaders and Paris. During the summit, the French leaders, knowing of their country’s military weaknesses versus Germany, advised Nicholas II to avoid doing anything that might cause a war with Germany.