Infantry Tactics - Jungle Warfare

Jungle Warfare

Jungle warfare was heavily shaped by the experiences of all the major powers in the Southeast Asian theater of operations during the Second World War. Jungle terrain tended to break up and isolate units. It tended to fragment the battle. It called for greater independence and leadership among junior leaders, and all the major powers increased the level of training and experience level required for junior officers and NCOs. But fights in which squad or platoon leaders found themselves fighting on their own also called for more firepower. All the combatants, therefore, found ways to increase both the firepower of individual squads and platoons. The intent was to ensure that they could fight on their own … which often proved to be the case.

Japan, as one example, increased the number of heavy weapons in each squad. The "strengthened" squad used from 1942 onwards was normally 15 men. The Japanese squad contained one squad automatic weapon (a machinegun fed from a magazine and light enough to be carried by one gunner and an assistant ammunition bearer). A designated sniper was also part of the team, as was a grenadier with a rifle-grenade launcher.

The squad's TO&E also included a grenade launcher team armed with what historians often mistakenly call a "knee mortar". This was in fact a light mortar of 50mm that threw high explosive, illumination and smoke rounds out to as much as 400 meters. Set on the ground and fired with arm outstretched, the operator varied the range by adjusting the height of the firing pin within the barrel (allowing the mortar to be fired through small holes in the jungle canopy). The balance of the squad carried bolt-action rifles.

The result was that each squad was now a self-sufficient combat unit. Each squad had an automatic weapons capability. In a defensive role, the machinegun could be set to create a “beaten zone” of bullets through which no enemy could advance and survive. In an attack, it could throw out a hail of bullets to keep the opponent’s head down while friendly troops advanced. The light mortar gave the squad leader an indirect "hip-pocket artillery" capability. It could fire high-explosive and fragmentation rounds to flush enemy out of dugouts and hides. It could fire smoke to conceal an advance, or illumination rounds to light up any enemy target at night. The sniper gave the squad leader a long-range point-target-killing capability.

Four squads composed a platoon. There was no headquarters section, only the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant. In effect, the platoon could fight as four independent, self-contained battle units (a concept very similar to the US Ranger “chalks.”)

The British Army did extensive fighting in the jungles and rubber plantations of Malaya during the Emergency, and in Borneo against Indonesia during the Confrontation. As a result of these experiences, the British increased the close-range firepower of their individual riflemen by replacing the pre-World War II bolt-action Lee-Enfield with lighter, automatic weapons like the American M-2 carbine and the Sterling submachine gun.

However, the British Army was already blessed in its possession of a good squad automatic weapon (the Bren) and these remained apportioned one per squad. They comprised the bulk of the squad’s firepower, even after the introduction of the self-loading rifle (a semi-automatic copy of the Belgian FN-FAL). The British did not deploy a mortar on the squad level. However, there was one 2-inch mortar on the platoon level.

The US Army took a slightly different approach.

They believed the experience in Vietnam showed the value of smaller squads carrying a higher proportion of heavier weapons. The traditional 12-man squad armed with semi-automatic rifles and an automatic rifle was knocked down to 9 men: The squad leader carried the M-16 and AN/PRC-6 radio. He commanded two fire teams of four men apiece (each containing one team leader with M-16, grenadier with M-16/203, designated automatic rifleman with M-16 and bipod, and an anti-tank gunner with LAW and M-16).

Three squads composed a platoon along with two three-man machinegun teams (team leader with M-16, gunner with M-60 machinegun, and assistant gunner with M-16). The addition of two M-60 machinegun teams created more firepower on the platoon level. The platoon leader could arrange these to give covering fire, using his remaining three squads as his maneuver element. The M-16/203 combination was a particular American creation (along with its M-79 parent). It did not have the range of the Japanese 50mm mortar. However, it was handier, and could still lay down indirect high-explosive fire, and provide support with both smoke and illumination rounds. The US Army also had 60mm mortars. This was a bigger, more capable weapon than the Japanese 50mm weapon. But it was too heavy for use on the squad or even the platoon level. These were only deployed on the company level.

The deficiency of the US formation remained the automatic rifleman, a tradition that had gone back to the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) gunner of World War II. The US Army discovered that an automatic rifle was a poor substitute for a real machinegun. A rifle fired in the sustained automatic role easily overheated, and its barrel could not be changed. Post-Vietnam, the US Army adopted the Belgian Minimi to replace the automatic M-16. With an interchangeable barrel and larger magazine, this weapon, known as the M249 in U.S inventory, provided the sustained automatic fire required.

The Republic of Singapore Army, whose experience is 100% in primary and secondary jungle as well as rubber plantation terrain, took the trend one step further. Their squad contained only seven men, but fielded two squad automatic gunners (with 5.56mm squad automatic weapons), two grenadiers with M-16/203 under slung grenade launchers, and one anti-tank gunner with rocket launcher and assault rifle.

So in short, jungle warfare increased the number of short/sharp engagements on the platoon or even squad level. Platoon and squad leaders had to be more capable of independent action. To do this, each squad (or at least platoon) needed a balanced allocation of weapons that would allow it to complete its mission unaided.