Husband E. Kimmel - Pearl Harbor

Pearl Harbor

After Admiral James O. Richardson was removed as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet in February 1941, Kimmel assumed command with the temporary rank of admiral. The base for the fleet had been moved from its traditional home at San Diego, California to Pearl Harbor in May 1940. On February 18, 1941, Kimmel wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations:

"I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility, and we are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay."

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor occurred on December 7, 1941. Edwin T. Layton related that during the attack, "Kimmel stood by the window of his office at the submarine base, his jaw set in stony anguish. As he watched the disaster across the harbor unfold with terrible fury, a spent .50 caliber machine gun bullet crashed through the glass. It brushed the admiral before it clanged to the floor. It cut his white jacket and raised a welt on his chest. ′It would have been merciful had it killed me,′ Kimmel murmured to his communications officer, Commander Maurice "Germany" Curts."

In The World at War, a naval serviceman—who had been alongside Admiral Kimmel during the attack—recalled that as Kimmel watched the destruction of the fleet, he tore off his four-star shoulder boards and replaced them with those of a rear admiral, in apparent recognition of the impending end of his command of the Pacific Fleet.

Kimmel was relieved of his command in mid-December 1941, while he was in the midst of planning and executing retaliatory moves, including an effort to relieve and reinforce Wake Island which might have led to an early clash between American and Japanese carrier forces. He took an early retirement in 1942. He spent much of his time defending himself in front of various hearings, pointing out that all the key information which would have enabled him to anticipate the attack was never made available to him.

Some historians, such as submariner Captain Edward L. "Ned" Beach, later believed Admiral Kimmel and Army Lieutenant General Walter Short became scapegoats for the failures of their superiors prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that their careers were effectively and unfairly ruined.

Edwin T. Layton (later Rear Admiral Layton), chief intelligence officer for Kimmel, and one of the officers who knew Kimmel best, provided support for Kimmel′s position in his book And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (1985).

Admiral Layton argued Kimmel had not been provided complete information, and that Kimmel deployed the few reconnaissance resources at his disposal in the most logical way, given the available information.

On the other hand, Kimmel′s critics point out that he had been ordered (on November 27, 1941, 10 days prior to the attack) to initiate a "defensive deployment" of the fleet. Kimmel understood this to mean defense against sabotage, and so made the necessary arrangements. Because of this misinterpretation, ships were kept in port and the fleet was not placed on alert. Moreover, after his intelligence unit lost track of Japan′s aircraft carriers, Kimmel did not order any long-range air or naval patrols to assess their positions, in part for lack of serviceable PBYs, in part because he also had a training schedule to maintain, and in part because the Army Air Corps had the responsibility for long-range patrol (but even less capability in Hawaii than he did, since the Philippines had higher priority).

Even if Kimmel had reacted more effectively, it is not clear the results would have been any better for the Americans. In a 1964 interview, Admiral Chester Nimitz, who became commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet three weeks after the attack, concluded that "it was God′s mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7." If Admiral Husband Kimmel, the commander in Hawaii, had "had advance notice that the Japanese were coming, he most probably would have tried to intercept them. With the difference in speed between Kimmel's battleships and the faster Japanese carriers, the former could not have come within rifle range of the enemy's flattops. As a result, we would have lost many ships in deep water and also thousands more in lives." Instead, at Pearl Harbor, the crews were easily rescued, and six battleships ultimately raised. This was also the reaction of Joseph Rochefort, head of, who remarked the attack was cheap at the price.

Robert Stinnett, in his book Day of Deceit (2001), claims Kimmel was deliberately kept ignorant, at least indirectly on the specific orders of Franklin D. Roosevelt, because the president and others were aware not only of Japan's intent to attack Pearl Harbor, but also of the date and time. Kimmel, Stinnett argues, was given deceptive orders. In fact, Kimmel was denied access to for security reasons, and worked poorly with his Army counterpart, General Short, who had responsibility for defending the fleet. Stinnett argues Kimmel and Short were made scapegoats to cover up deliberately allowing the Japanese to strike in order to arouse American public opinion. This thesis is rejected by most historians.