Hamlet Chicken Processing Plant Fire - Investigation

Investigation

An investigation was immediately launched by state authorities, joined one month later by federal investigators. Investigators found indentations left on at least one door by people attempting to kick it down. There were concentrations of bodies around fire exits and inside a large walk-in freezer where panicked workers had sought shelter. Some sources thought they froze to death, in temperatures as low as −28 °F (−33 °C), but the official report says they were killed by smoke infiltration around the improperly closed door. Twelve deaths occurred in this area, though five people survived in the freezer, although injured. Timothy Bradly, North Carolina's Deputy Commissioner of Insurance, said that technically "There was not a single door in the plant that met the criteria of a fire exit."

The fire was caused by failure of a hydraulic line which powered a conveyor belt supplying the cooker vat. When the original line developed a leak, a worker originally replaced it with new line and with new connections. Later the line, which was too long and created a tripping hazard, was shortened, but in the process the worker replaced the new end connector with the old fitting.

The line was rated to 3,000 psi (20,700 kPa), while normal operating pressure never fluctuated higher than 1,500 psi (10,300 kPa). When the line with a customized connector was brought up to normal operating pressure, it separated from the connector at between 800 and 1,500 psi (5,500–10,300 kPa). Hydraulic fluid spattered onto the heating lines for the cooker and immediately vaporized. This vapor then went directly into the flame of the gas-fired cooker. The vapor had a relatively low flash point and erupted into a fireball. The ruptured hydraulic line then pumped 50 to 55 US gallons (40–45 imp. gal/190–210 L) of hydraulic fluid into the fire before electrical failure shut it down.

A state-of-the-art automatic carbon dioxide fire extinguisher designed to cope with such fires had been installed over the vat after a non-fatal fire in 1983 at the fire department's request. This prevented the oil itself from igniting until the later stages of the fire.

State authorities were also blamed. The state labor commissioner, John C. Brooks, blamed his department's failure to inspect the plant on shortage of money and staff, and blamed the federal government for not enforcing stricter standards.