Euthyphro Dilemma - The Dilemma

The Dilemma

Socrates and Euthyphro discuss the nature of piety in Euthyphro. Euthyphro proposes (6e) that the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) is the same thing as what is loved by the gods (τὸ θεοφιλές), but Socrates finds a problem with this proposal: the gods may disagree among themselves (7e). Euthyphro then revises his definition, so that piety is only what is loved by all the gods unanimously (9e).

At this point the dilemma surfaces. Socrates asks whether gods love the pious because it is the pious, or whether the pious is only pious because it is loved by the gods (10a)? In other words, do the gods love something because it is pious, or is something pious because the gods love it? Socrates and Euthyphro both accept the first option: surely the gods love the pious because it is the pious. But this means, Socrates argues, that we are forced to reject the second option: the fact that the gods love (something) cannot explain why the pious is the pious (10d). This is because, if both options were true, they together would yield a vicious circle, with the gods loving the pious because it is the pious, and the pious being the pious because the gods love it. And this in turn means, Socrates argues, that the pious is not the same as the god-beloved, for what makes the pious the pious is not what makes the god-beloved the god-beloved. After all, what makes the god-beloved the god-beloved is the fact that the gods love it, whereas what makes the pious the pious is something else (9d-11a). Thus Euthyphro's theory does not give us the very nature of the pious, but at most a quality of the pious (11ab).