Effects-based Operations

Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is a United States military concept that emerged during the Persian Gulf War for the planning and conduct of operations combining military and non-military methods to achieve a particular effect. The doctrine was developed to take advantage of advancements in weaponry and tactics, from an emerging understanding that attacking a second-order target may have first order consequences for a variety of objectives, wherein the Commander's intent can be satisfied with a minimum of collateral damage or risk to his own forces.

EBO has been an emerging concept, with multiple views on what it meant and how it could be implemented. Most notably, military scientists at the Air Force Research Lab, the Army Research Lab and DARPA engaged in research to develop automated tools to annotate options and recommend courses of action. This is hard science and tools are slow to be implemented. For air forces, it supported the ability for a single aircraft to attack multiple targets, unlike tactics of previous wars, which used multiple aircraft to attack single targets, usually to create destruction without thought of later re-use by allied forces or friendly civilians.

EBO concepts emphasise the importance of technological sophistication in the Information Age, arguing that casualties can be avoided on both sides by taking advantage of the technological advances made since the end of the Cold War - for example, by utilising precision munitions and UAV attack drones. EBO concepts traditionally take a "systemic approach" to the enemy, arguing that the enemy's centre of gravity can be disrupted by attacking the command and control "mainframe" and the "support nodes" surrounding this central mainframe.

In 2008, Joint Forces Command stopped using the term "effects-based" after failure of the Army-led TEBO JCTD. The concept remains valid in the US Air Force.