Drive To The Siegfried Line - Logistics and Supply

Logistics and Supply

Although the breakout from Normandy had taken longer than planned, the advances until September had far exceeded expectations. Bradley, for example, by September, had four more divisions than planned and all of his forces were 150 mi (240 km) ahead of their expected position. One effect was that insufficient supplies could be delivered to the fronts to maintain the advance: actual demand had exceeded the expected needs.

Much war materiel still had to be brought ashore across the invasion beaches and through the one remaining Mulberry harbour. Although small harbours, such as Isigny, Port-en-Bessin and Courcelles, were being used, the major forward ports such as Calais, Boulogne, Dunkirk and Le Havre either remained in German hands as "fortresses" or had been systematically destroyed. The availability of Cherbourg had been valuable until the breakout, but then transport to carry supplies to the rapidly advancing armies became the limiting factor.

Although fuel was successfully pumped from Britain to Normandy via the Pluto pipeline, this still had to reach the fronts, which were advancing faster than the pipelines could be extended. The railways had been largely destroyed by Allied attacks and would take much effort to repair, so fleets of trucks were needed in the interim. In an attempt to address this acute shortage of transport, three newly-arrived U.S. infantry divisions—the 26th, 95th, and 104th—were stripped of their trucks in order to haul supplies. Advancing divisions of the U.S. 12th Army Group left all their heavy artillery and half their medium artillery left west of the Seine, freeing their trucks to move supplies for other units. Four British truck companies were loaned to the Americans. Unfortunately, 1,500 British trucks were found to have critical engine faults and were unusable, limiting assistance from that quarter. The Red Ball Express was an attempt to expedite deliveries by truck but capacity was inadequate for the circumstances.

The Dragoon Force advancing from southern France were supplied adequately from Toulon and Marseille because they had captured intact ports and the local railway system was less damaged. This source supplied about 25% of the Allied needs.

The U.S. supply organization—Communications Zone (COMZ)—is perceived to have failed to expedite solutions and to have been far too bureaucratic, employing 11,000 staff. COMZ and its commander—General John C. H. Lee—were roundly criticised by American field generals. Failures to supply forward units led to unofficial arrangements, with pressed units "diverting" supplies intended for elsewhere. Eisenhower felt he could not exert authority since COMZ was directly answerable to Washington and not to SHAEF, but Eisenhower has been criticised for not exerting more pressure and influence than he did.

The mere occupation of Antwerp was not enough, as the lands surrounding the Scheldt would have to be liberated first to open the port of Antwerp. This was essential, since at this point the main allied supply lines still ran back to Normandy, presenting serious logistical problems. The solution was to get Antwerp into effective action quickly. The problem here was that, although this major port had been captured almost intact, its sea access was blocked by German occupation of the Scheldt islands.

The delay in securing this area was seen as a major failure of Eisenhower′s "Broad Front" strategy, in failing to allow Sir Bernard Montgomery′s 21st Army Group to advance, the German 15th Army was able to occupy and then dig in, whereas an immediate attack in September would probably have cleared the Scheldt without difficulty. The consequence was that Eisenhower was obliged to limit his army group commanders to one major advance at a time. As a result, German resistance was allowed to organise and deploy reserves. The Canadian 1st Army was given the task of clearing the Scheldt (see below).