Dodecanese Campaign - Background

Background

Further information: Military history of Greece during World War II and Mediterranean Theatre of World War II

The Dodecanese island group lies in the south-eastern Aegean Sea, and had been under Italian occupation since the Italo-Turkish War. During Italian rule, the strategically well-placed islands became a focus of Italian colonial ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Rhodes, the largest of the islands, was a major military and aerial base. The island of Leros, with its excellent deep-water port of Lakki (Portolago), was transformed into a heavily fortified aeronautical base, "the Corregidor of the Mediterranean", as Mussolini boasted.

After the fall of Greece in April 1941 and the Allied loss of the island of Crete in May, Greece and its many islands were occupied by German and Italian forces. With the ultimate defeat of Axis forces in North Africa in spring 1943, Winston Churchill, who at least as far back as the Gallipoli Campaign had a deep interest in the region, turned his sights on the islands. The British envisaged an operation to capture the Dodecanese and Crete, and thus not only deprive the Axis of excellent forward bases in the Mediterranean, but also apply pressure on neutral Turkey to join the war. This would serve a favourite idea of Churchill's, of a "route through the Dardanelles to Russia as an alternative to the Arctic Convoys." In the Casablanca Conference, the initial go-ahead was given, and Churchill ordered his commanders to lay out relevant plans on 27 January 1943.

The plans, codenamed "Operation Accolade", called for a direct attack on Rhodes and Karpathos, with forces totaling three infantry divisions, an armoured brigade, and relevant support units. Landings at Crete, which was too well fortified and had a strong German garrison, were dropped. The main problem faced by the planners was the difficulty of countering the 10th Flying Corps (X Fliegerkorps) of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) because of a lack of air cover, since the United States and British aircraft were based in Cyprus and the Middle East. This challenge was further exacerbated by the demands of the upcoming invasion of Sicily. The United States were skeptical about the operation, which they regarded as aiming mostly at post-war political benefits for Britain, and an unnecessary diversion from the main front in Italy. They refused to support it, warning the British that they would have to go on alone.

As an Italian surrender became increasingly possible, in August 1943 the British started preparations to take quickly advantage of a possible Italian-German split, in the form of a scaled-down "Accolade". A force based on 8th Indian Division started being assembled, and American assistance in the form of P-38 Lightning long-range fighter squadrons was requested. As a result of the Quebec Conference however, and the American refusal to assent to the British plans, the forces and ships earmarked for "Accolade" were diverted to other fronts, barely a week before the surrender of Italy on 8 September.