David Sztybel - Research

Research

Sztybel develops a new theory of animal rights which he terms "best caring," as outlined in his paper, "The Rights of Animal Persons." Criticizing conventional theories of rights based on intuition, traditionalism or common sense, compassion, Immanuel Kant's theory, John Rawls' theory, and Alan Gewirth's theory, Sztybel devises a new theory of rights for human and nonhuman animals. Sztybel bases his theory, in part, on the idea that sentient beings are ends-in-themselves, a theory of emotional cognition which verifies that some things really are good or bad for sentient beings. This is a non-utilitarian or "individuals-respecting" theory that defends the proposition that all sentient beings should be legally recognized as persons.

He is critical of utilitarianism and the traditional feminist ethics of care. He also takes issue with the traditional notion of animal welfare, which supports the use of animals if steps are taken to avoid "unnecessary" suffering, the parameters of which vary. Sztybel argues that we would never call the same treatment of humans, mentally disabled or otherwise, to be consistent with their welfare. He coined the term "animal illfare" to describe conventional animal treatment. He holds that true animal welfare would only entail wishing animals good (never anything avoidably malicious). He supports that fully realized substantial animal rights correspond to a significant respect for all sentient beings.

Sztybel contends that Singer's philosophy of animal liberation is not really about liberating animals in general; he accuses Singer of being a speciesist for defending the vivisection of animals on the ground that they have inferior cognitive capacities. In so doing, Singer is effectively sanctioning the harmful treatment of nonhuman animals on the basis of a species-characteristic which does not justify violent treatment.

He also provides a critique of the abolitionist views of Gary L. Francione and Joan Dunayer, who argue that animal rights supporters should not pursue a welfarist approach. A defense of suffering-reduction laws and a discussion of the logical problems of anti-welfarism are featured in Sztybel's article, "Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism."