Bloody April

Bloody April is the name given to the events of April 1917 during the First World War. In April 1917 the British Army began an offensive at Arras. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) supported British operations by offering close air support, aerial reconnaissance and strategic bombing of German targets. The RFC's commanding officer, Hugh Trenchard believed in the offensive use of air power and pushed for operations over German-controlled territory. It was expected the large numbers of aircraft assembled over the frontlines in the spring, 1917 would fulfil this purpose. However, the aircraft were, for the most part, inferior to German fighter aircraft. The arrival of the new Sopwith Camel in the summer was a welcome sign of future potential, but for the spring, the mian front line fighter, the Sopwith Pup, did not reach the same standards. Crucially, pilot training was short and varied in quality among training instructors. Large numbers of pilots lacked practical flight experience before reaching the war zone.

For the Germans, their pilot training was, at that time, more thorough and longer than the British programmes. After the heavy losses and failures against the French over Verdun in 1916, they had reorganised their air forces in the Luftstreitkräfte into specialised fighter units. These units were led by highly experienced pilots. Paradoxically, the Germans' tactical advantage was expanded by their numerical inferiority. The German air forces confined themselves to mostly operating over friendly territory, thus reducing the possibility of losing pilots to capture and increasing the amount of time they could stay in the air. Moreover, they could choose when and how to engage in combat.

Over the 30 day period the RFC lost a large amount of pilots and aircraft. The losses were so disastrous that it threatened to undermine the morale of entire Squadrons. Nevertheless, the RFC contributed to the success, albeit limited, of the British Army during the five-week campaign; its observer aircraft rendering valuable reconnaissance to the British artillery. The tactical, technological and training differences between the two sides ensured the British suffered a casualty rate nearly three times as great as their opponents. From January to May the RFC lost 708 aircraft—275 fell in battle during Bloody April.

The RFC learned from their mistakes, instituting new policies on the improvement of training and tactical organisation. By mid-1917 better aircraft designs were reaching the front. By the late summer 1917 the British achieved a measure of air superiority they had lost in April. The casualities in the air campaigns through the remainder of the war were never so one sided again.