In evolutionary game theory, best response dynamics represents a class of strategy updating rules, where players strategies in the next round are determined by their best responses to some subset of the population. Some examples include:
- In a large population model, players choose their next action probabilistically based on which strategies are best responses to the population as a whole.
- In a spatial model, players choose (in the next round) the action that is the best response to all of their neighbors (Ellison 1993).
Importantly, in these models players only choose the best response on the next round that would give them the highest payoff on the next round. Players do not consider the effect that choosing a strategy on the next round would have on future play in the game. This constraint results in the dynamical rule often being called myopic best response.
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Famous quotes containing the words response and/or dynamics:
“Women had to deal with the men’s response when the women wanted more time “out” of the home; men now must deal with the women’s response as men want more time “in.””
—Kyle D. Pruett (20th century)
“Anytime we react to behavior in our children that we dislike in ourselves, we need to proceed with extreme caution. The dynamics of everyday family life also have a way of repeating themselves.”
—Cathy Rindner Tempelsman (20th century)