Battle of The Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket - Assessment

Assessment

The battle around Korsun was a Soviet victory. The German salient was collapsed and the forces therein forced to retreat through a gauntlet of Soviet fire. Viewing the details of the battle, however, make it clear that both sides in the battle committed errors.

The typical insistence of Hitler on holding the exposed salient strongly limited the options of German field commanders. German intelligence, however, failed to note the formation and assembly of the Soviet 6th Tank Army, thus giving the Soviets back some element of surprise. Following the Soviet encirclement of the German forces, the German relief efforts produced mixed results. XLVII Panzer Corps' attacks were almost ineffective because of the weakness of its divisions, and III Panzer Corps wasted a week on a failed attempt to encircle the Soviet forces that formed the Korsun Pocket. When III Panzer Corps was finally given a realistic mission of relieving Gruppe Stemmermann, German logistics proved incapable of keeping Bäke's heavy tank regiment supplied, leading Bäke to stop the advance on Hill 239 because one group of his tanks had run out of fuel. This failure of logistics was compounded by the vagueness of the radio message to General Stemmermann ordering the breakout attempt. Hill 239 remained under Soviet control, which subsequently caused high casualties among Stemmermann's group.

The Soviet performance was also beset by errors. Soviet intelligence on German forces in the pocket was faulty and overestimated their strength. At the same time, the Soviets underestimated German capability for a counter-attack, and had to rapidly insert more forces to bolster the strength of their encircling rings. The Soviet air force failed to strongly hinder the German aerial resupply effort, allowing the German forces within the pocket to hold out longer before being forced to retreat. Ultimately, the strength of the encircling forces proved insufficient to prevent a German breakout, allowing a significant portion of the trapped Germans to escape. Finally, given the initial circumstances of the battle, the degree of Soviet losses makes clear that while the Soviets won at Korsun, it was a victory that came at a high price.

Controversy exists to this day over casualties and losses. Soviet sources claim 57,000 killed and 18,000 prisoners. The high numbers given are attributed by sources to the erroneous Soviet belief that all German units were at their full establishment and that most of the German 8th Army was trapped. German accounts state that the under 60,000 men originally inside the pocket had shrunk in heavy fighting to less than 50,000 by 16 February, that 45,000 took part in the breakout and "that 27,703 German soldiers and 1,063 Russian auxiliaries had broken out unscathed. In addition 7,496 wounded" got through to III Panzer Corps plus the 4,161 wounded previously evacuated from the pocket by air, leaving behind a total of 19,000 dead, wounded, captured or missing (adding up to over 31,000 casualties total). Contemporaneous German documents listed per unit survivors, with total escapees as 40,423, including the wounded flown out of the pocket and evacuated from Lysyanka. Soviet sources give their losses for the operation as 24,286 killed and missing, and 55,902 sick and wounded, for a total of 80,188 casualties for the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts over the period January 24 – February 17, 1944.