Battle of The Gebora - Prelude To Battle

Prelude To Battle

Soult could not besiege so strong a fortress as Badajoz with his reduced force and therefore changed his plans. Sending his light cavalry under Brigadier General André Briche to take Mérida and leaving four squadrons of dragoons at Albuera to watch the garrison at Badajoz, he marched with the remainder of his army to invest Olivenza. Wellington had previously advised General Pedro Caro de La Romana, commander of the Spanish Army of Extremadura, either to destroy the fortification at Olivenza or to repair its defences and fully garrison it; La Romana in turn had instructed Mendizabal to slight the fortress, but Mendizabal ignored this order and instead reinforced the garrison with four infantry battalions. Soult, arriving on 11 January, was therefore confronted with a strongly garrisoned, but untenable, fortress. The heavy French artillery finally began to arrive on 19 January, and by 22 January, a poorly-repaired breach in the fortress's walls had been reopened. The garrison surrendered on 23 January, with over 4,000 Spanish troops from the Army of Extremadura taken captive.

Soult was now in a difficult position: although he had a large (4,000-strong) contingent of cavalry, deploying two battalions to escort the prisoners taken at Olivenza back to French-held Seville left him only 5,500 infantry with which to continue his campaign. Moreover, although his siege-train had begun to arrive, the continued absence of Gazan's infantry division left him with a weakened army. Despite these problems, Soult decided to besiege Badajoz in hopes that Wellington would send reinforcements to the Spanish fortress and thereby reduce the Allied forces facing Masséna at the Lines of Torres Vedras. On 26 January, Soult marched for Badajoz, sending Latour-Maubourg with six cavalry battalions across the Guadiana to blockade the fortress's northern approach, and by 27 January, the first siege of Badajoz had begun. Gazan's division eventually re-joined Soult's army on 3 February, further strengthening the besieging force by 6,000 men.

Meanwhile, Mendizabal had retreated to the Portuguese border after sending two battalions to reinforce the garrison at Badajoz. Weakened by the defeat at Olivenza and by Ballesteros's continued absence, he sent to La Romana for reinforcements, receiving on 14 January 1,800 men sent from Abrantes and under the command of Carlos de España. Additionally, about 6,000 troops were sent forward from the Lines of Torres Vedras on 19 January, arriving at Elvas on 29 January. When these forces joined with Mendizabal's remaining 3,000 men, a Spanish cavalry division, and a brigade of Portuguese horse, the Allies had an army almost 15,000 strong, intended to be under the command of La Romana, with which to hold Soult in check. La Romana, however, died of an aneurysm on 23 January, and command of the army then fell to Mendizabal.

Before his sudden death, La Romana had met with Wellington and agreed on a plan for the campaign—the army was to entrench on the heights of San Cristóbal, with its right flank protected by the fort of San Cristóbal, its front covered by the Gebora and Guadiana rivers, the left guarded by the fortress at Campo Maior, and Elvas protecting the rear. Although aware of this plan when he took command, Mendizabal chose to ignore the instructions upon arriving on the north bank of the Guadiana on 5 February. Instead, he stationed the bulk of his infantry in Badajoz, leaving only a small contingent of foot soldiers and his cavalry below San Cristóbal. On 7 February, Mendizabal launched a strong sally against the besieging French lines: the Portuguese cavalry, supported by a small group of infantrymen, feinted towards the French left wing while a strong force of 5,000 men attacked the right. The Spaniards under de España drove through the first French parallel to engage one of General Jean-Baptiste Girard's brigades and were only driven back when Mortier sent several battalions to Girard's aid. De España pulled back to Badajoz, having lost 650 men and causing 400 French casualties.

On 9 February, Mendizabal withdrew most of his men from Badajoz, leaving behind a 7,000-strong garrison. The field army's 9,000 infantry settled on the heights of San Cristóbal while the 3,000 horse encamped behind them on the plains of the Caya. The Spanish commander again ignored Wellington's plan, failing to dig entrenchments on the heights; nor did he send out a cavalry screen to protect his front and monitor the French movements. Soult, however, largely ignored the Spanish army for the next few days, concentrating instead on building up his siege lines and battering Badajoz. Heavy rains also flooded both the Guadiana and Gebora rivers, rendering them impassable, so that between 11–18 February, the French were only able to shell the southern end of the Spanish line, pushing the Spaniards further away from Badajoz and the protection of the San Cristóbal fort.