Battle of Groix - Aftermath

Aftermath

Bridport gave instructions as he withdrew for Alexandre, Formidable and Tigre to be taken under tow by HMS Prince, HMS Barfleur and HMS Prince George respectively. The British fleet was in good condition: five ships had seen no action at all and of those that had fought, only Queen Charlotte had suffered any significant damage, principally to her rigging. the British fleet had lost 31 men killed and 113 wounded, with Queen Charlotte and Colossus with the heaviest casualties of 36 and 35 respectively. Bridport placed prize crews on the captured vessels and sent them back to Britain while turning the fleet back eastwards once it had reached a safe distance from the coast, in order to provide support for Warren's expedition to Quiberon. Warren landed the French Royalist forces at Carnac on 27 June, but the invasion ended in disaster a month later, the surviving Royalists driven back to the coast and collected by Warren. Bridport had remained off Quiberon to ensure that Villaret did not return to harass the expeditionary force, only returning to Britain on 20 September leaving the bulk of the blockade fleet off the Breton coast under Rear-Admiral Henry Harvey. The 68-year old admiral was forcibly retired in October after an unrelated argument with First Lord of the Admiralty Earl Spencer, but was reinstated in 1796 and continued to serve in command of the Channel Fleet until 1800.

Villaret meanwhile gathered his scattered ships and called a council of his senior officers on Peuple to discuss their next course of action. The French admiral believed that Bridport had only temporarily retired and would be soon returning to continue the engagement. He therefore proposed to anchor off the Breton coast in a strong defensive position and await Bridport's attack. This scheme was vociferous opposed by Rear-Admirals Kerguelen and Étienne Eustache Bruix who argued that in such a position the British would be able to use the weather gage to bombard the French at will and attack them with fireships. Following their advice, Villaret decided to shelter the fleet in the nearby port of Lorient to seek supplies and repairs before returning to Brest. He found however that, having sailed without sufficient provisions, Lorient was not equipped for a fleet of this size and Villaret was forced to discharge the majority of sailors as he was unable to feed them. It wasn't until December and the winter storm season that a number of the ships were able to travel quietly up the coast to Brest, while others were sent southwards to Rochefort. French casualties had been heavy, although they have not been reported other than on the captured vessels, which totaled 670 killed and wounded. In the aftermath of the action, Villaret wrote a letter condemning the behaviour of a number of his officers, stating "Soit ignorance, soit ineptie, soit insubordination, malgré nos signaux réitérés, des ordres transmis par porte-voix, rien ne fut fait. Nos boulets atterissaient dans l'eau, le patriotisme à lui seul ne peut manoeuvrer un navire" ("Be it ignorance, ineptitude or insubordination, in spite of our repeated signals, nothing was done. Our shots landed in water, patriotism alone cannot manoever a ship"). Several French captains were court-martialed: Jean Magnac of Zélé, already blamed for the failure at Cornwallis's Retreat, was dismissed from the Navy, as was Captain Giot-Labrière of Fougueux. Captain Larréguy of Mucius was censured for not adequately supporting Tigre and three other captains were tried but acquitted.

In common with the battle of the Glorious First of June the previous year, rewards for the British victory at Groix were unevenly distributed. Bridport's dispatch to the Admiralty was short and lacking in detail, the only officer commended being Bridport's own flag captain William Domett, whose ship had only joined the action in the last stages. The situation was worsened by the Parliament of Great Britain, who voted thanks for the battle but specifically named only Bridport, Lord Hugh Seymour and Vice-Admiral Sir Alan Gardner of Queen. This omitted not only the numerous captains who had taken part in the battle, but also Vice-Admiral John Colpoys of London, whose ship had been much more heavily engaged than Gardner's. Numerous historians have commented on these unexplained omissions, William James noting that Douglas and Queen Charlotte were particularly unfortunate in this regard as the admiral normally aboard, Rear-Admiral Sir Roger Curtis, was ashore at the court-martial of Captain Anthony Molloy and consequently the ship received no recognition despite being the most heavily engaged of any in the British fleet. All three captured ships were taken into the Royal Navy, Alexandre reverting to Alexander: James suggests that the ship was never again fit for frontline service, but this is refuted by Alexander's presence in the line at the Battle of the Nile in 1798 under Captain Alexander Ball. Tigre retaining her French name while Formidable, as there was already a ship of that name in the Royal Navy, became HMS Belleisle, apparently due to confusion between the islands of Groix and Belle Île in the aftermath of the battle. Belleisle had a long and successful career, fighting at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 under Captain William Hargood.

More controversial than the distribution of commendations was the debate over Bridport's decision to withdraw from the battle while the remainder of the French fleet was still within reach. In his official dispatch, the British admiral wrote that "If the Enemy had not been protect and sheltered by the Land, I have every reason to believe that a much greater Number, if not all the Line of Battle ships, would have been taken or destroyed" going on note that "When the ships struck, the British squadron was near to some Batteries, and in the Face of a strong Naval Port . His subsequent concern for the Quiberon expeditionary convoy also demonstrates that he considered its protection his principal duty. However in the opinion of French admiral Kerguelen, "S'ils avaient bien manouevré, ils auraient pu, ou prendre tous nos vaisseaux, ou les faire périr à la côte" (If had maneuvered successfully they could have taken all of our vessels, or made them perish on the coast). Historians have considered this view and most agree that Bridport's retirement was premature: In 1827 James noted that the scattered remains of the French fleet could easily have been attacked by the unengaged British rear with the advantage of the weather gage, while William Laird Clowes wrote in 1901 that "We may be pretty sure that had a Nelson, a Hawke or even a Boscawen commanded on the occasion, the fleet of Villaret would have been annihilated." Twenty first century historians Noel Mostert and Richard Woodman have compared Groix with the battles of Genoa and Hyères fought earlier in the year in the Mediterranean, where in similar circumstances another elderly admiral, William Hotham, had also allowed scattered and retreating French fleets to escape when they might have been destroyed.