Strategic Implications
Throughout the war, Japan was dependent on sea transport to provide adequate resources, including food, to the home islands and supply its military at garrisons across the Pacific. Before the war, Japan estimated the nation required 5,900,000 long tons (6,000,000 t) of shipping to maintain the domestic economy and military during a major war, which was considerably less than the 6,400,000 long tons (6,500,000 t) of shipping in the Japanese merchant fleet and 1,200,000 long tons (1,200,000 t) of smaller craft at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Despite the awareness shipping was vital, the Japanese military accorded anti-submarine warfare a low priority and allocated few warships and aircraft to protecting merchant shipping For instance, their destroyers had deficiencies in sonar and radar compared to equivalents of other navies, despite their impressive night fighting capabilities, even though these warships formed the bulk of convoy protection. Moreover, Japanese Navy doctrine in relation to commerce defense was derisively bad. The Japanese also seriously underestimated the threat from Allied submarines, whose ineffectiveness in the early part of the war reinforced Japanese overconfidence.
The size and effectiveness of the Allied submarine force increased greatly during the Pacific War. At the start of the war, a high proportion of the submarines deployed against the Japanese were obsolete, and U.S. boats were hampered by defects in their primary weapon, the Mark 14 torpedo, as well as by poor training (an excessive reliance on sonar, due to an undue fear of destroyers' sonar and aircraft), insufficiently aggressive skippers, poor dispositions (scattered on close surveillance of Japan's major bases), and divided command (which kept submarines out of one of the best hunting areas, the Luzon Strait, for fear of fratricide). Growing numbers of modern submarines became available from 1942 onwards. The efforts of Admiral Charles A. Lockwood were crucial for the rectification of the Mark 14's problems (which were nevertheless not resolved until September 1943), and for the selection of more aggressive submarine skippers. As a result of all of these developments, assisted by signals intelligence (breaking the "maru code" in January 1943, after a gaffe by U.S. Customs prewar had caused Japan to change it), U.S. submarines inflicted devastating losses on Japanese merchant shipping in 1943 and 1944. In conjunction with attacks by aircraft, including aerial minelaying, U.S. submarines had effectively destroyed the Japanese merchant fleet by January 1945. Poor torpedoes claimed at least two U.S. submarines out of 42 lost in action.
Read more about this topic: Allied Submarines In The Pacific War
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