AirLand Battle - DePuy Reforms

DePuy Reforms

For much of the 1950s and early 60s the US warfighting doctrine was based on the use of nuclear weapons. Air forces were the primary delivery mechanism of these strikes, relegating land forces to a secondary role of briefly holding terrain while the nuclear strikes took their toll. It was expected that any attempt to concentrate forces for conventional land attack would only invite a nuclear strike against them, so if the Army was to play a role they would have to be dispersed and able to rapidly concentrate. The US Army attempted to adapt to this battlefield with their PENTANA concept, but found little interest and were constantly underfunded in their attempts to produce the more mobile force PENTANA demanded.

The Vietnam War demonstrated that not only was there a very real role for conventional armed forces, but also that focus on the European theater as the basis of any future conflict was obviously misplaced. As the war in Vietnam wound down, the US Army started studying their organization and structure, looking for ways to better align it with real-world conflicts. In 1973 they formed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), under the direction of General William E. DePuy, to study these issues and produce better doctrine for their forces.

TRADOC concluded that there were two main possibilities for future conflicts, a major armored conflict in Europe, or a primarily infantry fight in other locations around the world. The latter possibility led to the ill-fated Rapid Reaction Force. The former was more problematic given the Warsaw Pact's massive numerical superiority, especially given the ending of Selective Service.

When the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973, it demonstrated a new lethality of conventional weapons, especially the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM). The new vulnerability of tanks, combined with the improved defensive power of the infantry, led to a revolution of thought within the US Army – that a war in Europe was winnable with conventional weapons. Impressed by the new weapons, DePuy started the process of re-arming the heavy divisions with weapons that would dramatically improve their firepower.

In DePuy's view, firepower had increased so much that war would be won or lost almost immediately, in the first few massive battles. As Field Manual 100-5 noted, "The US Army must above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war."

Since forces from the rear could not move forward quickly enough to take place in the titanic battles being envisioned, everyone had to be placed as close to the front lines as possible. The result was a new battlefield organization that moved the vast majority of US and allied forces much closer to the border between East and West Germany, in what became known as "forward defense". As reinforcements from the US could play only a minor role, the war was a "come as you are" affair. Air power was key; as the battle increased in tempo and the Soviet forces attempted to break through the defenders, channels would naturally form that would be attacked by air.

One problem that was noted soon after the introduction of the 1976 Operations was the problem of how to deal with the enemy's reserve forces in the rear. There was the possibility that the US could win the first battle, only to meet a second unattrited reserve force soon after. A solution to this problem was not immediately forthcoming.