1995 Ais Gill Rail Accident - Enquiry

Enquiry

The official enquiry into the accident concluded that the conductor of the derailed train (2H88) failed in his paramount duty to protect his train in the event of an incident by laying down detonators and displaying a red flag one mile away from the obstruction. As the driver of the train was incapacitated, the conductor should have protected the line in front of the train in case another train should approach from the opposite direction (as in fact actually happened). The time between the initial derailment and the subsequent collision was about six or seven minutes which would have allowed a much greater warning time to be given to the second train, and may have prevented the collision or at least reduced its impact.

Further recommendations were made concerning the inadequate communications between Railtrack Control Rooms and inefficient use of the National Radio Network. A "group call" to all trains in the vicinity of the incident could have been made by the Control Room and might have alerted the second train to the obstruction in time to prevent the collision.