Vance V. Terrazas - Background

Background

Laurence Terrazas was born in the United States in 1947. Because Terrazas's father was Mexican and because Mexico's then-effective citizenship laws followed the principle of ius sanguinis, Terrazas held Mexican citizenship at birth, and because he was born in the United States, Terrazas also held U.S. citizenship under the ius soli of the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore, Terrazas was a dual citizen of the United States and Mexico at birth.

While enrolled at a Mexican university in 1970, Terrazas applied for a certificate of Mexican nationality. As part of his application, Terrazas signed a statement renouncing "United States citizenship, as well as any submission, obedience and loyalty to any foreign government, especially to that of the United States of America."

During subsequent discussions with a U.S. consular official, Terrazas gave conflicting answers as to whether or not he had truly intended to abandon his rights as a U.S. citizen when he applied for his certificate of Mexican nationality. The State Department eventually concluded that he had lost his U.S. citizenship—a decision which Terrazas appealed, first before the State Department's board of appellate review, and subsequently to the courts.

Before the 1967 Supreme Court ruling in Afroyim v. Rusk, U.S. law had provided for numerous ways for U.S. citizens to lose their citizenship. In its Afroyim ruling, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment barred Congress from revoking anyone's U.S. citizenship without their consent. Specifically, the court held that a law automatically revoking the U.S. citizenship of anyone who had voted in a foreign election was unconstitutional and unenforceable. However, U.S. law continued after Afroyim to list several other "expatriating acts," the voluntary performance of any of which would result in automatic loss of citizenship.

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that according to Afroyim v. Rusk, "Congress is constitutionally devoid of the power" to revoke citizenship; and further, that Congress had no power to legislate any evidentiary standard for proving Terrazas's intent to relinquish his citizenship that fell short of a requirement of proof by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. The Secretary of State appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court, questioning not only the appellate court's finding on the required standard of proof, but also challenging the finding that a separate intent to give up citizenship was required (as opposed merely to the performance of a designated expatriating act).