U.S. Intelligence Involvement With German and Japanese War Criminals After World War II - Morality Versus Utility in International Relationships

Morality Versus Utility in International Relationships

Ethicists have long debated the proper balance between conceptual standards and apparently practical decisions. This debate becomes even more complex when "presentism" is a facet of retrospective reviews of decisions: were the decisions reasonably moral by the standards prevailing at the time they were made, rather than by the standards of the present. These ideas are not abstractions, but guided real-world choices that decision makers often, especially in the Cold War, thought were the least of an assortment of evils.

Even at the time, ethicists can recognize that there is no ideal choice. Thomas Aquinas' principle of double effect is a classic way of choosing between difficult alternatives. In the context of war criminals, both suspected and established, several factors arise:

1. Would exposure of the individual damage a relationship that does recognized good (e.g., cooperation between nations)?
2. Does the individual have information that is of significant independent value and that is available through no other means?
3. Can the individual blackmail the nation involved, such that he might release even more damaging information?
4. Is there information to be learned or precedents to be set by prosecution?

IWG member Elizabeth Holtzmans argued that, in the European context, the declassified war crimes documents "force us to confront not only the moral harm but the practical harm" of relying on intelligence from ex-Nazis. What conclusions do you draw about using tainted sources to gather intelligence?" Timothy Naftali observed that the moral argument was well established, but a common counterargument was "Well these people are useful, and sometimes you have to make moral compromises."