The Naturalization of Intentionality

The Naturalization Of Intentionality

According to Franz Brentano, intentionality refers to the “aboutness of mental states that cannot be a physical relation between a mental state and what is about (its object) because in a physical relation each of the relation must exist whereas the objects of mental states might not exist.”

Tim Crane, author of The Mechanical Mind, believes that representation should be considered a “basic natural feature of the world.” He defines the term ‘basic’ as something that does not, and cannot, be furthered explained in terms of other facts or concepts. He feels that it should just be accepted as a fundamental concept in our everyday lives. He compares representation to the concept of energy in physics. He states that “the concept of energy is accepted as basic – there is no explanation of energy in terms of any other concepts” He further argues, “why not take representation, then, as one of the basic features of the world.” (The Mechanical Mind, p. 170).

Several problems arise for features of intentionality, which are unusual for materialistic relations. Representation is unique. When 'x represents y' is true, it's not the same as other relations between things, like when 'x is next to y' or when 'x caused y' or when 'x met y', etc. Representation is different because, for instance, when 'x represents y' is true, y need not exist. This isn't true when say 'x is the square root of y' or 'x caused y' or 'x is next to y'. Similarly, when 'x represents y' is true, 'x represents z' can still be false, even when y = z. Intentionality encompasses relations that are both physical and mental. In this case, “Billy can love Santa and Jane can search for unicorns even if Santa does not exist and there are no unicorns.”