The Bomber Will Always Get Through - Strategic Bombing in Combat

Strategic Bombing in Combat

Post-war analysis of the strategic bombing during World War II indicated that Baldwin's statement was essentially correct in that bombers would get through, but at a cost in aircrew and aircraft. Under the Dowding system, fighter aircraft directed by radar were able to disrupt the German daytime offensive during the Battle of Britain, forcing the Luftwaffe to turn to less accurate night-time bombing in The Blitz. The difficulties for night-fighters meant this was relatively unopposed, but the bombing was ineffective in damaging civil morale.

The Royal Air Force's Bomber Command lost a total of 8,325 aircraft on bombing missions during the war, during a total of 364,514 sorties. This represents 2.3% losses per mission on average. However loss rates over Germany were significantly higher, between November 1943 and March 1944 operations over that country resulted in an average 5.1% loss rate (Bomber Command - Max Hasting p334). The disparity in loss rates was reflected in the fact that sorties over France were only counted as a third of an op towards the "tour" total ( Yorkshire Airfields - P Otter p262). Furthermore the official loss rate figures never included aircraft crashing in the UK on their return (usually due to damage picked up on the operation) even if the machine was a write off and/or some or all of the crew were killed, this added at least 15% to the official loss figures (Bomber Command - Max Hastings p209 + P460/461). Losses on that scale could be made good through increased production and training efforts though at great cost. Indeed, the size of Bomber Command's offensive grew throughout the war. The US Strategic bombing survey came to the same conclusion. However, Douhet's belief that a small number of bombs would be successful in forcing a country to surrender proved incorrect, and bombing alone did not cause the collapse he had expected in either Britain or Germany.

In the Pacific War, bombing missions were effectively concluded by both Japan and the Western Allies. Early in the War, Japanese carrier aircraft successfully destroyed or disabled the battleships of the United States Pacific Fleet at anchor in Hawaii, and they destroyed the great majority of bombers and defensive aircraft there and in the Philippine Islands. The US forces were unable to make effective use of radar based in Hawaii and visual spotters in the Philippines that should have provided an early warning to their fighter squadrons. In later stages, US bombers effectively destroyed many Japanese cities with conventional bombs before the use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.