Security
Tamper-resistant microprocessors are used to store and process private or sensitive information, such as private keys or electronic money credit. To prevent an attacker from retrieving or modifying the information, the chips are designed so that the information is not accessible through external means and can be accessed only by the embedded software, which should contain the appropriate security measures.
Examples of tamper-resistant chips include all secure cryptoprocessors, such as the IBM 4758 and chips used in smartcards, as well as the Clipper chip.
It has been argued that it is very difficult to make simple electronic devices secure against tampering, because numerous attacks are possible, including:
- physical attack of various forms (microprobing, drills, files, solvents, etc.)
- freezing the device
- applying out-of-spec voltages or power surges
- applying unusual clock signals
- inducing software errors using radiation (e.g., microwaves or ionising radiation)
- measuring the precise time and power requirements of certain operations (see power analysis)
Tamper-resistant chips may be designed to zeroise their sensitive data (especially cryptographic keys) if they detect penetration of their security encapsulation or out-of-specification environmental parameters. A chip may even be rated for "cold zeroisation", the ability to zeroise itself even after its power supply has been crippled. In addition, the custom-made encapsulation methods used for chips used in some cryptographic products may be designed in such a manner that they are internally pre-stressed, so the chip will fracture if interfered with.
Nevertheless, the fact that an attacker may have the device in his possession for as long as he likes, and perhaps obtain numerous other samples for testing and practice, means that it is practically impossible to totally eliminate tampering by a sufficiently motivated opponent. Because of this, one of the most important elements in protecting a system is overall system design. In particular, tamper-resistant systems should "fail gracefully" by ensuring that compromise of one device does not compromise the entire system. In this manner, the attacker can be practically restricted to attacks that cost less than the expected return from compromising a single device (plus, perhaps, a little more for kudos). Since the most sophisticated attacks have been estimated to cost several hundred thousand dollars to carry out, carefully designed systems may be invulnerable in practice.
Read more about this topic: Tamper Resistance
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