Sydney Rowell - Second World War - Kokoda Track

Kokoda Track

On 31 July 1942, Blamey informed Rowell that I Corps headquarters would be sent to Port Moresby to control operations in New Guinea. Rowell arrived in Port Moresby on 13 August 1942 and assumed command of New Guinea Force from Major General Basil Morris. Rowell's I Corps headquarters took over operational control from Morris's, which became that of ANGAU. The only warning that Morris had of Rowell's arrival was a message from the DCGS, Vasey, which simply said: "Syd is coming". The situation was dire. Japanese were steadily advancing on Port Moresby along the Kokoda Trail and were also threatening Milne Bay and Wau. Rowell and his staff were all seasoned officers with combat experience in the Middle East and the Battle of Malaya and "brought to New Guinea skill and organisation that Morris and his staff had been unable to provide". However, the main body of Rowell's staff did not arrive until 17 August. Rowell turned down a suggestion from Blamey that he needed additional base staff to cope with his administrative problems, given that a corps headquarters was a tactical headquarters, intended to operate as part of an army, with the latter handling most of the administrative work. Rowell's staff gradually discovered how enormous the task before them was; they had few maps, the only transport aircraft were destroyed in a Japanese raid, and the supplies that had been forwarded by air to Kokoda could not be located.

Rowell refused to give General Douglas MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) in Brisbane a "ball to ball" description of the action, sending only factual information at stated times. Failure to keep GHQ up to date could only lead to fears of the worst, which were confirmed when Major General George Kenney reported that in his opinion Port Moresby would soon fall unless something drastic was done, and Rowell was "defeatist". On 17 September, the General MacArthur discussed the situation in New Guinea with Prime Minister John Curtin on the secraphone. He pointed out that while the Japanese faced all the same difficulties as the Australian troops fighting on the Kokoda Track, the Japanese were advancing and the Australians were retreating, and the whole situation seemed to MacArthur to be a lot like the Malaya. He recommended that General Blamey be sent up to New Guinea to take personal command of the situation.

"I'm leaving for New Guinea in a few days," Blamey told Burston, his Director General of Medical Services, on 18 September.

"Why?" Burston asked. "Are you worried about New Guinea?"
"No," said Blamey, "But Canberra's lost it!"
They were talking in Blamey's office in Victoria Barracks, Melbourne. Blamey had just had talks on the secraphone with both Curtin and MacArthur. Each of them had instructed him to go to Port Moresby. These were not recommendations or requests; they were orders for every practical purpose.

"I remember what happened to the Auk in the desert and I'm off!" Blamey told Burston.

Blamey took over command of New Guinea Force, but not I Corps. The difference was academic insofar as there was only one staff. Blamey wrote a letter to Rowell to explain the situation in advance of his arrival in Port Moresby on 23 September:

The powers that be have determined that I shall myself go to New Guinea for a while and operate from there... I hope you will not be upset at this decision, and will not think that it implies any lack of confidence in yourself. I think it arises out of the fact that we have very inexperienced politicians who are inclined to panic on every possible occasion, and I think that the relationship between us personally is such that we can make the arrangement work without any difficulty.

Rowell took it very badly. He wrote to Major General Cyril Clowes at Milne Bay:

The plain fact is that he hasn't enough moral courage to fight the Cabinet on an issue of confidence in me. Either I am fit to command the show or I am not. If the latter, then I should be pulled out. He comes here when the tide is on the turn and all is likely to be well. He cannot influence the local situation in any way, but he will get the kudos and it will be said, rather pityingly, that he came here to hold my hand and bolster me up."

On 25 September, at MacArthur's suggestion, Blamey flew to Milne Bay with Brigadier General Kenneth Walker and ordered Clowes to send a force by air to Wanigela. This would be an important step forward. Rowell, Kenney noted, was "not even consulted anymore". Rowell was furious at Blamey bypassing him. Blamey reported back to Prime Minister Curtin that:

On arrival here I informed General Rowell of my instructions from the Prime Minister and the CinC SWPA . He proved most difficult and recalcitrant considering himself very unjustly used. I permitted him to state his case with great frankness. It was mainly statement of grievances primarily against myself because he had received only one decoration for war services in Middle East where certain other officers had received two.

He charged me with having failed to safeguard his interests and he felt he was being made to eat dirt. All my persuasion could not make him see matters realistically.

On second evening I asked General Burston as an old friend of Rowell to endeavour to induce a proper frame of mind but Burston met with no success.

Instead of setting out full information here for me I have to search out details and feel a definite atmosphere of obstruction.

Urge that Herring be sent immediately by air as successor to Rowell. If Herring not approved, Mackay second choice but Herring much younger, this important in this climate.

Re disposal of Rowell if you decide to continue his services he could replace Herring in command of II Corps but events here make me doubtful of wisdom of allocating disgruntled officer to this appointment. In this connection Morshead now cables that he would be glad to accept Stevens as second in command AIF in Middle East. Rowell competent to fill Darwin which is a major general's command. II Corps command could be operated by senior division commander temporarily and by General Eichelberger with a mixed American and Australian staff.