Surrender of Japan - Supreme Council For The Direction of The War

Supreme Council For The Direction of The War

Japanese policy-making centered on the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (created in 1944 by earlier Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso), the so-called "Big Six"—the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Army, Minister of the Navy, Chief of the Army General Staff, and Chief of the Navy General Staff. At the formation of the Suzuki government in April 1945, the council's membership consisted of:

  • Prime Minister: Admiral Kantarō Suzuki
  • Minister of Foreign Affairs: Shigenori Tōgō
  • Minister of the Army: General Korechika Anami
  • Minister of the Navy: Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai
  • Chief of the Army General Staff: General Yoshijirō Umezu
  • Chief of the Navy General Staff: Admiral Koshirō Oikawa (later replaced by Admiral Soemu Toyoda)

All of these positions were nominally appointed by the Emperor and their holders were answerable directly to him. Nevertheless, from 1936 the Japanese Army and Navy held, effectively, a legal right to nominate (or refuse to nominate) their respective ministers. Thus, they could prevent the formation of undesirable governments, or by resignation bring about the collapse of an existing government.

Emperor Hirohito and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kōichi Kido also were present at some of the meetings, following the emperor's wishes.

Read more about this topic:  Surrender Of Japan

Famous quotes containing the words supreme, council, direction and/or war:

    It was the supreme expression of the mediocrity of the apparatus that Stalin himself rose to his position.
    Leon Trotsky (1879–1940)

    Parental attitudes have greater correlation with pupil achievement than material home circumstances or variations in school and classroom organization, instructional materials, and particular teaching practices.
    —Children and Their Primary Schools, vol. 1, ch. 3, Central Advisory Council for Education, London (1967)

    Your Englishman, confronted by something abnormal will always pretend that it isn’t there. If he can’t pretend that, he will look through the object, or round it, or above it or below it, or in any direction except into it. If, however, you force him to look into it, he will at once pretend that he sees the object not for what it is but for something that he would like it to be.
    James Agate (1877–1947)

    There is the guilt all soldiers feel for having broken the taboo against killing, a guilt as old as war itself. Add to this the soldier’s sense of shame for having fought in actions that resulted, indirectly or directly, in the deaths of civilians. Then pile on top of that an attitude of social opprobrium, an attitude that made the fighting man feel personally morally responsible for the war, and you get your proverbial walking time bomb.
    Philip Caputo (b. 1941)