Stalingrad Class Battlecruiser - Background and Genesis

Background and Genesis

The roots of the Project 82-class began back in May 1941 when the Main Naval Staff approved tactical requirements (Russian: Operativno Takticheskoye Zadanie) for a medium-sized cruiser between the light cruisers of the Kirov and Chapayev classes and the "heavy cruisers" of the Kronshtadt class in size. It was intended to fulfill the following roles:

• Engage enemy cruisers armed with 203 mm (8.0 in) guns
• Destroy enemy light cruisers
• Support its own light cruisers
• Lay minefields
• Suppress the enemy's medium-caliber coast defense batteries and support landing operations
• Conduct operations against the enemy's maritime lines of communication

To accomplish these missions the Navy expected a ship of 20,000 tonnes (20,000 long tons) or smaller, armed with eight 203-millimeter (8.0 in) and twelve 100-millimeter (3.9 in) guns, twelve 37-millimeter (1.5 in) anti-aircraft guns and one triple 533-millimeter (21.0 in) torpedo mount. It was to be armored to withstand 203 mm shells with a speed not less than 36 knots (41 mph; 67 km/h), a range of 10,000 nmi (18,520 km) at 20 knots (23 mph; 37 km/h) and able to carry four seaplanes launched by two catapults. Three preliminary designs were proposed in response, but only one, which displaced 25,000 tonnes (25,000 long tons), was able to meet all of the requirements. However, the designers recommended an increase in the main armament caliber to 220 millimeters (8.7 in), a strengthened anti-aircraft battery and reductions in the armor protection, speed, and range, but the start of Operation Barbarossa a month later rendered these plans moot.

The project was revived in 1943 with a new requirement issued on 15 September. This was basically identical to the original, but added one new requirement: "Protect the operations of aircraft carriers and conduct joint operations with them." Estimated characteristics were a displacement between 20,000–22,000 tonnes (20,000–22,000 long tons), nine main guns between 210–230 mm (8.3–9.1 in), a secondary battery of a dozen 130-mm dual-purpose guns and thirty-two 37-mm AA guns. The speed, range and aircraft requirements remained the same, although the torpedo tubes were dropped. Over a dozen preliminary designs had been proposed by May 1944, but none were acceptable. A new tactical requirement was issued in November 1944 that envisioned a more realistic displacement of 25,000–26,000 tonnes (25,000–26,000 long tons) while the speed was dropped to 33 knots (38 mph; 61 km/h) and the range to 8,000 nmi (14,820 km). Armament was also revised to nine 220-mm guns, sixteen 130-mm guns, thirty-two 45-millimeter (1.8 in) and twenty 23-millimeter (0.91 in) AA guns. These last guns were changed to 25 mm (0.98 in) in 1945.

Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov believed that these ships could protect the planned Soviet aircraft carriers in bad weather from American cruisers and pushed to have them built, but the Shipbuilding Commissariat balked. It refused to begin detailed design work pleading the uncertainty of the post-war building situation and the already heavy workload of its design bureaux. Undeterred, the Navy continued studying cruiser designs and planned a ten-year construction programme for the period 1946–1955. This was based on defensive operations along the periphery of the Soviet Union against Anglo-American carrier groups while submarines would attack their lines of communication. Ten of these large cruisers were envisioned as part of this construction program. When the program was discussed by the Politburo on 29 September 1945 there was no great disagreement on the large cruisers, although Stalin favored increasing the size of their main guns to 305 mm (12.0 in), but did not push the issue when Admiral Kuznetsov resisted.

A bigger problem was the resistance of the Shipbuilding Commissariat which said it would be impossible to lay down any ships of new design until about 1950 and that only incremental changes could be made to the designs currently in production. The Navy saw no reason why new ships, reflecting wartime experience, could not be laid down beginning in 1948. To resolve the dispute a special commission was appointed, led by Lavrentiy Beria, which mostly sided with the Shipbuilding Commissariat in that most ships of the program would be improved versions of current designs. Four of the large cruisers were to begin construction, two each at Shipyard 402 in Molotovsk and Shipyard 444 at Nikolayev with another three planned to be laid down in 1953 and 1955. This compromise was approved on 27 November 1945 and detailed design work began in 1946 for designs equipped with both the 220-mm and 305-mm guns.

This was reaffirmed by a decree of the Council of Ministers on 28 January 1947. By August 1947, the Navy and the Shipbuilding Ministry had winnowed down design proposals to only three, one from each armed with 305 mm guns and a joint design armed with 220 mm guns. The latter's design was slightly smaller (2,000 tonnes (2,000 long tons)) than the Navy's 40,000 tonnes (39,000 long tons) design, and had an armor belt 50 mm (2.0 in) thinner, but was otherwise almost identical. The joint design was 2,000 tonnes (2,000 long tons) smaller with a reduced secondary armament, but was about 1.5 knots (1.7 mph; 2.8 km/h) faster. All proposals had a range of 6,000 nmi (11,110 km) at 18 knots (21 mph; 33 km/h). These designs weren't reviewed until March 1948, probably because of the need to coordinate reaction to the American Marshall Plan, and Stalin approved the Navy's more heavily protected design. But even this was subject to more delays as the detailed specifications had to be approved and this didn't occur until 31 August 1948, likely delayed by the Tito–Stalin split and the start of the Berlin Blockade, both in June.

With the approval of the specifications, TsKB-17, the heavy-ship design bureau, began work on the sketch design to be submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers before the start of the technical design could begin. By March 1949, four alternatives had been completed, differing mainly in the arrangement of the 130 mm guns and the boiler layout. The bureau preferred one layout and the Navy and the Shipbuilding Ministry concurred so the bureau began the technical design, without formal approval, in order to be ready to lay down the first two ships in the third quarter of 1950 as already scheduled. However, when Stalin reviewed the sketch design in September 1949, he rejected it, ordering a smaller, faster ship capable of 35 knots (40 mph; 65 km/h). TsKB-17 was able to produce a preliminary technical design that met Stalin's demands by the end of the year, an amazingly fast amount of time for what should have been a very involved process. The most likely explanation is that the designers retained as much of their original work as possible and found room for the more powerful turbines and more numerous boilers necessary to attain Stalin's specified speed by deleting the two rear twin 130 mm turrets, and their magazines, as revealed by a comparison of the 1949 and 1951 sketches.

The Navy didn't like the compromises made to reduce the displacement down to Stalin's 36,000 tonnes (35,000 long tons) and to achieve the high speed demanded as revealed in a March 1950 meeting in the Kremlin where Stalin revealed critical points about his thoughts for these ships. When the admirals responded to his question about the purpose of these ships by saying that they were to fight the enemy's heavy cruisers, he contradicted them and said that their purpose was to fight light cruisers: "It is necessary to increase its speed to 35 knots and create a cruiser that will cause panic among the enemy's light cruisers, disperse and destroy them." Furthermore he believed that they would fight close to home, defending the coastal waters of Soviet Union. "You cannot blindly copy the Americans and English, they face different conditions, their ships travel far over the ocean, out of touch with their bases. We are not considering conducting oceanic battles, but instead will fight close to our own shores, so we do not need a large ammunition supply on the ship." The admirals also did not like the reduction in the secondary armament made to accommodate the larger machinery and extra boilers needed to reach the speed desired by Stalin, but he reminded them that most aircraft would attack the battlecruiser at heights below 1,500 m (4,900 ft) and the ceiling of the 130 mm was far in excess of that. He also ordered a reduction in the light anti-aircraft guns believing that its escorts would defend it. This design was approved by the Council of Ministers on 25 March 1950.

This allowed the technical design process to begin and it was completed in December 1950. Reviews by the Navy and Shipbuilding Ministries in February 1951 led to some significant changes to the design in April. The original form of the bow was similar to that of the Chapayev-class light cruisers, but sea trials of the lead ship of that class in December 1950—January 1951 proved that she was very wet forward, which hindered her seakeeping ability. The Stalingrad's bow form was radically altered with a much more raked stem, its sheer and flare were greatly increased and the ship gained almost 10 m (32 ft 10 in) in length, possibly in response to the Chapayev's problems. In addition the thickness of her belt armor was increased from 150 to 180 mm (5.9 to 7.1 in), possibly in response to weight savings elsewhere. This final design was submitted for approval on 4 June 1951, but preparations for the working design drawings began before it was approved.