Soviet Deep Battle - Intended Outcomes; Differences With Other Methodologies

Intended Outcomes; Differences With Other Methodologies

In principle, the Red Army would seek to destroy the enemy operational reserves, his operational depth and occupy as much of his strategic depth as possible. Within the Soviet concept of deep operations was the principle of strangulation if the situation demanded it, instead of physically encircling the enemy and destroying him immediately. Triandafillov stated in 1929:

The outcome in modern war will be attained not through the physical destruction of the opponent but rather through a succession of developing manoeuvres that will aim at inducing him to see his ability to comply further with his operational goals. The effect of this mental state leads to operational shock or system paralysis, and ultimately to the disintegration of his operational system. The success of the operational manoeuvre is attained through all-arms combat (combined arms) at the tactical level, and by combining a frontal holding force with a mobile column to penetrate the opponent's depth at the operational level. The element of depth is a dominant factor in the conduct of deep operations both in the offensive and defensive.

The theory moved away from the Clausewitzian principle of battlefield destruction and the annihilation of enemy field forces, which obsessed the Germans. Instead deep operations stressed the ability to create conditions whereby the enemy loses the will to mount an operational defence. An example of this theory in practice is Operation Uranus in 1942. The Red Army in Stalingrad was allocated enough forces to hold the German Sixth Army in the city, causing attrition which would force it to weaken its flanks to secure its centre. Meanwhile reserves were built up, which then struck at the weak flanks. The Soviets broke through the tactical zones of the German flanks and exploited the operational depth, closing the pocket at Kalach-na-Donu.

The operation left the German tactical zones largely intact. But by occupying the German operational depth and preventing their retreat the German Army forces were isolated. Instead of reducing the pocket immediately, the Soviets tightened their grip on the enemy forces, preferring to let the enemy weaken and surrender, starve him completely, or a combination of these methods before delivering a final destructive assault. In this way the Soviet tactical and operational method opted to besiege the enemy into submission, rather than destroy it physically and immediately.

In this sense, the Soviet deep battle, in the words of one historian, “was radically different to the nebulous ‘blitzkrieg’” method, although it produced similar if more strategically impressive results.