Soviet Deep Battle - Deep Operations During World War II

Deep Operations During World War II

The abandonment of deep operations had a huge impact on Soviet military capability. Entering the Second World War after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Soviets struggled to relearn it. The surprise German invasion (Operation Barbarossa) subjected the Red Army to six months of disasters. The Red Army was shattered during the first two months. Thereafter it faced the task of surviving, then reviving and maturing into an instrument that could compete with the Wehrmacht and achieve victory.

Soviet military analysts and historians divide the war into three periods. The Red Army was primarily on the strategic defensive during the first period of war (22 June 1941–19 November 1942). By late 1942 the Soviets had recovered sufficiently to put their concept into practice. The second period of war (19 November 1942 – 31 December 1943), which commenced with the Soviet strategic counteroffensive at Stalingrad, was a transitional period marked by alternating attempts by both sides to secure strategic advantage. After that deep battle was used to devastating effect, allowing the Red Army to destroy hundreds of Axis divisions. After the Battle of Kursk the Soviets had firmly secured the strategic initiative and advanced beyond the Dnepr River. The Red Army maintained the strategic initiative during the third and final period of war (1944–1945) and ultimately played a vital role in the Allied victory.

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