Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
A generalization of backward induction is subgame perfection. Backward induction assumes that all future play will be rational. In subgame perfect equilibria, play in every subgame is rational (specifically a Nash equilibrium). Backward induction can only be used in terminating (finite) games of definite length and cannot be applied to games with imperfect information. In these cases, subgame perfection can be used. The eliminated Nash equilibrium described above is subgame imperfect because it is not a Nash equilibrium of the subgame that starts at the node reached once the entrant has entered.
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