Set Theory - Objections To Set Theory As A Foundation For Mathematics

Objections To Set Theory As A Foundation For Mathematics

From set theory's inception, some mathematicians have objected to it as a foundation for mathematics. The most common objection to set theory, one Kronecker voiced in set theory's earliest years, starts from the constructivist view that mathematics is loosely related to computation. If this view is granted, then the treatment of infinite sets, both in naive and in axiomatic set theory, introduces into mathematics methods and objects that are not computable even in principle. Ludwig Wittgenstein questioned the way Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory handled infinities. Wittgenstein's views about the foundations of mathematics were later criticised by Georg Kreisel and Paul Bernays, and investigated by Crispin Wright, among others.

Category theorists have proposed topos theory as an alternative to traditional axiomatic set theory. Topos theory can interpret various alternatives to that theory, such as constructivism, finite set theory, and computable set theory.

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