Serfdom in Tibet Controversy - Competing Versions of Tibetan History - The Academic Debate

The Academic Debate

The academic debate as to whether "serf" is an applicable term for a society such as pre-Communist Tibet continues to this day. Goldstein and Miller's exchanges in an academic journal between 1986 and 1989 were a notable part of this debate. The applicability of the concept of serfdom to Tibet was debated between Melvyn Goldstein and anthropologist Beatrice D. Miller of Wisconsin University over a series of five articles in the Tibet Journal. The debate was initiated by Goldstein in the XI edition of the Tibet Journal, in which he defended his description of the features of Tibetan society as being very comparable to European serfdom. He based the comparison on the features of serfdom described by French historian Marc Bloch including:

• The status was hereditary.
• A serf, unlike a slave had rights and possessed but did not own productive resources (land).
• The lord had the legal right to command his serfs, including judicial authority over him or her.

Goldstein argued that Tibetan society fulfilled all these requirements, and argued in detail against the specific diverging opinions of fellow scholars Miller, Micheal, Dargyay and Aziz. He underpinned his assertions by research, first hand accounts and case studies, and responded to criticisms which had been voiced by these researchers in the preceding years.

Only Miller responded in the next The Tibet Journal, in a short letter, in 1987. She acknowledged Goldstein's scholarship, stating "Goldstein's article ... cannot be faulted. It is an outstanding example of his exemplary collection of fine data." She disagreed however with his interpretation, specifically the use of the word "serf" and challenged him by asserting the following:

• That a lord also had obligations to the central government, so the specific obligations of a peasant (Tibetan: "mi ser") to a lord were only examples of societal obligations which everyone had.
• That the obligations owed to a lord were by the family collective, and not "personal" or individual.
• That the obligations of a peasant were not so onerous as it was easy to run away.

In the following issue Goldstein replied in brief arguing:

• The nature of the lord's relation with the central government was radically different to the peasant/lord relation and not relevant to the peasant/lord relation he was discussing
• While corvee obligations fell primarily on households, a peasant's legal status very much related to his person, was hereditary and not rescindable.
• He pointed out that running away was illegal, punishable and European serfs also ran away.
• He strongly disagreed with Millers assertion that the peasant/lord relation was fundamentally contractual.

In a later publication and response Goldstein agreed to differ on the use of the word "serf" to prevent a terminological discussion distracting from the examination of societal conditions. He argued that running away was an act of desperation severing familial, social and economic ties. He discussed the form of partial manumission known as "human lease" and argued that it: only temporarily freed from daily service but not occasional service at the lord's discretion; the payment of an annual fee decided by the lord was required; it was revocable at will by the lord. Thus he felt it was a very weak form of manumission.

Coleman, integrating Goldstein's research with subsequent work done by other scholars including Rebecca French, Graham Clarke, and Franz Michael, argues that Goldstein overemphasized the de jure status of the mi ser at the expense of de facto characteristics - a high degree of social and economic mobility, and hence autonomy; frequently successful negotiations with lords to improve their status; and flight from untenable situations such as unpayable debts and exorbitant labor requirements. He concludes that "serf" is a misleading term for the Tibetan mi ser.