Second Schleswig War - Strategy

Strategy

There were so-called "flank positions" near Ebeltoft (North), the fortified city of Fredericia (center), and Dybbøl in the south designed to support the strategy of defending the peninsula of Jutland along the north-south axis using naval supremacy to move the army north-south and hence trap an invading army in futile marches between these flank positions. This would deny the (assumed superior) invader the chance of forcing the defenders into a decisive battle, and give the defenders the opportunity to swiftly mass and counter-attack weak enemy positions, besieging forces, or divided forces by shifting weight by sea transport. The political dimension of this strategy was to draw out the war and hence give time and opportunity for the "great powers" to intervene diplomatically — it was assumed that such an intervention would be to the advantage of (neutral) Denmark. This strategy had been successful in the First Schleswig War.

Unrealistic expectations of the potency of the Danish army and incompetence at the political level had overruled the command of the army's wishes to defend Jutland according to the above plan, and instead favoured a frontal defense of Jutland on or near the historical defense (and legendary border) line at the Danevirke, near the city of Schleswig in the south. Hence resources had been put into the Danevirke line and not into the flank positions, which stayed akin to battlefield fortifications rather than modern fortifications capable of withstanding a modern bombardment.

The problem with the Danevirke line was that perhaps it was relatively strong against a frontal assault, but in a severe winter the entire position could be easily encircled to the west and to the east (though with more difficulties). Hence defense along the Dannevirke line was, correctly, anticipated by the Danish high command to be a trap, in which its army would be surrounded and forced to give battle at hopeless odds.

When the Prusso-German army approached the "Danevirke line", the estuaries and marshes that had been planned to support the flanks were frozen solid in a hard winter and the command of the Danish army disobeyed orders and ordered a full, orderly retreat back north to "the old Dybbøl" and its ill-prepared flank position. There is little doubt that the command of the army did not believe that they could successfully repulse a well-prepared German siege and consequent assault on the Dybbøl position, and assumed that the political level would let the army be evacuated by sea and then fight the war on the principles of the north-south axis strategy.

But the political level did not appreciate the gravity of the situation, insisting on maintaining military presence in Schleswig and at the same time refused more modest German demands of peace. Hence the army was ordered to defend the Dybbøl position "to the last man", and consequently the siege of Dybbøl began.