Royal Lao Air Force - History - American Response To The Soviets

American Response To The Soviets

In response to the Soviet air bridge, U. S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had his officials prompt Thailand to supply six AT-6 Texans to the RLAF as a light strike capability on 9 January 1961. In turn, the Thais were compensated by the Americans with five jet Cessna T-37 Tweets. Three Lao pilots for the AT-6s were already available, including Thao Ma. The new light strike craft flew their first successful sorties on 15 January. One of the T-6s was shot down on 17 January 1961. The RLAF augmented its pilots' ranks with four volunteer Thai pilots from the Royal Thai Air Force's 63rd Squadron, who began flying missions by mid February. Most of the remaining T-6s became casualties in March, with two colliding in midair, one falling to ground fire, and another lost on a training flight. The RLAF was temporarily nearly wiped out.

During March and April 1961, in an abortive attempt to beef up RLAF firepower, 18 U. S. Air Force officers volunteered for discharge and entry into Operation Mill Pond. These pilots were commissioned into the RLAF so they could fly Douglas A-26 Invader bombers in Laos. They were augmented by four Air America pilots. However, political considerations in the wake of the Bay of Pigs Invasion precluded use of the Invaders.

The United States began its own air bridge in April 1961, as well as a melange of photographic reconnaissance efforts. RLAF transport capacity was augmented to 13 Douglas C47s, and were used for the RLAF's first significant airlift when they carried three battalions of Royal Lao troops to Sam Neua. The U. S. also supplied ten more AT-6s for ground attack missions to the RLAF via the medium of the Thai air force. During a four plane sortie by AT-6s flown from Luang Prabang's airfield during April 1961, Lieutenant Khampanh of the RLAF downed a Soviet Ilyushin Il-4 of its air bridge fleet, using unguided missiles to do so. This was the RLAF's sole air-to-air victory. However, shortcomings of the aging AT-6s were becoming apparent to the U. S. suppliers; T-28 Trojans were bruited for the RLAF's future. T-28s being deaccessed by the South Vietnamese Air Force were earmarked for the RLAF, but not delivered because of the truce.

On 2 May 1961, the communists overran the airfield at Moung Sing; the following day, they captured an RLAF C-47 that landed because its crew was unaware of the communist takeover.

The upshot of infantry clashes on the Plaine des Jarres was a directive from U. S. President John F. Kennedy in May 1961 that the U. S. Ambassador to Laos would serve as the de facto military commander in Laos. His approval was needed for all air strikes in country. The Air Attaché's office served as his staff for employment of air power in Laos.

The 10 May 1962 armistice limited RLAF operations, with the T-6s becoming non-operational, although Lao aviation cadets were forwarded to Lopburi, Thailand for T-28 training in June 1962. However, during the truce, Vang Pao used his CIA supported Hmong army of hilltribesmen to begin grubbing out short landing strips to be used for logistical support of his troops by helicopters and STOL aircraft. These tiny primitive air strips would proliferate throughout Laos and became a major component of the Royalist war effort; they would eventually be approximately 200 of these so-called Lima sites. They would be essential for resupply, quick aerial movement of troops, and refugee relief operations.

The International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos was signed on 23 July 1962, and went into effect in October. On 6 October 1962, the last of the American Military Advisory Group departed Laos in conformance with the Agreement. The following day, 40 Vietnamese communists having been repatriated out of the 7,000 known to have been in Laos, the North Vietnamese proclaimed they had honored the Agreement. Lip service to observing the Agreement would shape the entire American effort to organize and operate the RLAF, with all the American technicians and advisors accredited under diplomatic cover as military attachés. Although America would continue to support its Lao clients, it would also maintain the facade of observing the 1962 agreement.