Roger Myerson - Publications

Publications

Game theory and mechanism design

• "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research 2 (1977), 225–229.
• "Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility," Econometrica 45 (1977), 1631–1637.
• "Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," International Journal of Game Theory 7 (1978), 73–80.
• "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 47 (1979), 61–73.
• "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1981), 58–73.
• "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica 51 (1983), 1767–1797.
• "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Econometrica 52 (1984), 461–487.
• "Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility," in Social Goals and Social Organization, edited by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and Hugo Sonnenschein, Cambridge University Press (1985), 229–259.

He wrote a general textbook on game theory in 1991, and has also written on the history of game theory, including his review of the origins and significance of noncooperative game theory. He also served on the editorial board of the International Journal of Game Theory for ten years.

Myerson has worked on economic analysis of political institutions and written several major survey papers:

• "Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, and Performance," Journal of Economic Perspectives 9:1 (1995), 77–89.
• "Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction," Advances in Economic Theory and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, volume 1, edited by D. Kreps and K. Wallis (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pages 46–65.
• "Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems," European Economic Review 43 (1999), 671–697.

His recent work on democratization has raised critical questions about American policy in occupied Iraq.