Finitely Repeated Games
As explained earlier, finite games can be divided into two broad classes. In the first class of finitely repeated games where the time period is fixed and known, it is optimal to play the Nash strategy in the last period. When the Nash Equilibrium payoff is equal to the minmax payoff, then the player has no reason to stick to a socially optimum strategy and is free to play a selfish strategy throughout, since the punishment cannot affect him (being equal to the minmax payoff). This deviation to a selfish Nash Equilibrium strategy is explained by the Chainstore paradox. The second class of finitely repeated games are usually thought of as infinitely repeated games.
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Famous quotes containing the words repeated and/or games:
“The poem of the mind in the act of finding
What will suffice. It has not always had
To find: the scene was set; it repeated what
Was in the script.
Then the theatre was changed
To something else. Its past was a souvenir.”
—Wallace Stevens (1879–1955)
“In 1600 the specialization of games and pastimes did not extend beyond infancy; after the age of three or four it decreased and disappeared. From then on the child played the same games as the adult, either with other children or with adults. . . . Conversely, adults used to play games which today only children play.”
—Philippe Ariés (20th century)