Radar Jamming and Deception - Countermeasures

Countermeasures

• Constantly alternating the frequency that the radar operates on (frequency hopping) over a spread-spectrum will limit the effectiveness of most jamming, making it easier to read through it. Modern jammers can track a predictable frequency change, so the more random the frequency change, the more likely it is to counter the jammer.

• Cloaking the outgoing signal with random noise makes it more difficult for a jammer to figure out the frequency that a radar is operating on.

• Limiting unsecure radio communication concerning the jamming and its effectiveness is also important. The jammer could be listening, and if they know that a certain technique is effective, they could direct more jamming assets to employ this method.

• Most important factor to counter radar jammers is the operator training and attention to raw video signal. Any system can be fooled with a jamming signal but properly trained operator can detect abnormal patterns on the radar screen.

• Best indicator of jamming effectiveness to the jammer is countermeasures taken by operator. Jammer does not know if their jamming is effective before operator starts changing radar transmission settings.

• Using EW countermeasures will give away radar capabilities thus on peacetime operations most military radars are used on fixed frequencies, at minimal power levels and with blocked Tx sectors toward possible listeners(country borders)

• Mobile fire control radars are usually kept passive when military operations are not ongoing to keep radar locations secret

• Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars are innately harder to jam and can operate in Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) modes to reduce the chance that the radar is detected.