R. V. Krymowski - Decision

Decision

The court overturned the dismissal and held that "The appeal should be allowed. The acquittals are set aside and new trials ordered."

The decision of the Court was written by Justice Louise Charron. She first observed the hate speech law was discussed and held to be constitutional in the case R. v. Keegstra (1990). In Keegstra it was found that the definition of the crime was specific enough to be enforceable and its infringement on freedom of expression was minimal. In this case, this meant the Crown was obligated to show the protesters publicly promoted hatred against a racial or religious group. It was not disputed the Roma would be such a group. Moreover, the protesters targeted a specific group.

Charron faulted the trial finding as too focussed on the terms "Roma" and "Gypsies," and not on the general question of whether the protesters were attempting to promote hatred of the Roma. Charron emphasized the importance of studying the "totality of the evidence" and drawing reasonable conclusions to determine whether a group was subject to hate speech. It was suggested that evidence besides the use of the word "Gypsies" be considered. This included that the Roma were staying at a motel that was targeted, that neo-Nazi displays were used, and that the protesters advocated "White Power." Neo-Nazism was particularly important since the Nazi Germans persecuted the Roma in the Holocaust.

Finally, Charron noted that use of the words "Roma" and "Gypsies" as synonyms need not have been fully proven if it were reasonable enough to believe and not be disputed. The dictionaries used in the case made the use of the synonyms believable and understandable.