Polarity in International Relations - Unipolarity - American Primacy - Kenneth Waltz

Kenneth Waltz

In “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” Kenneth Waltz defends realist theory against a cascade of criticism that emerged after the Cold War. He provides a realist analysis of the currently unipolar structure of world politics, arguing that realism is the best theoretical lens to understanding international politics and the future of U.S. primacy. Waltz also takes on the democratic peace theory, which holds that no two democracies will go to war with the other, as one that doesn’t present a proper challenge to realism. War is rooted in the anarchic structure, or a self-help environment, of the international system, Waltz argues. Simply changing the domestic political structure of countries will not eliminate war. Waltz notes, however, that “democracies seldom fight democracies.” But democracies are more likely to initiate wars against non-democracies because the former believes the latter must become democratized so as make the democratic peace more robust. Thus, the spread of democracy can increase the amount of war in the world in Waltz’s view. The second challenge to realist theory argues that economic interdependence promotes peace. Waltz believes this causal logic is backward: Peace can promote economic interdependence. Peace abounds when a political monopoly on force, or a favorable balance of power, prevents revisionist powers from altering the status quo. After all, strong economic interdependence did not prevent war in 1914. The third challenge that Waltz confronts is the rise of international institutions as primary actors in international politics. Waltz argues that the structure of power in the international system determines the role of institutions. NATO, for example, is often cited as an institution that has outlived its original mandate—preventing a Soviet onslaught of Western Europe. In Waltz’s view, NATO’s continued existence conveniently “illustrates how international institutions are created and maintained by stronger states (e.g., the United States) to serve their perceived and misperceived interests.” Finally, Waltz turns to the question of international politics and provides a realist interpretation to the U.S. unipolar moment, which he believes is fleeting for two reasons. With no great power to check its adventurism, the United States will weaken itself by misusing its power internationally. “Wide latitude” of “policy choices” will allow the U.S. to act capriciously on the basis of “internal political pressure and national ambition.” Second, even if the United States acts benevolently, states will still attempt to balance against it because the power asymmetry demands it: In a self-help system, states worry not about other states’ intentions as they do other states' capabilities. “Unbalanced power leaves weaker states feeling uneasy and gives them reason to strengthen their positions,” Waltz says. He sees China as already beginning to counter U.S. power. In conclusion, the U.S. unipolar moment is fleeting and multipolarity is already materializing.