Operation Summer '95 - Prelude

Prelude

In November 1994, the Siege of Bihać, a battle of the Bosnian War, entered a critical stage as the VRS and the RSK came close to capturing the town. A strategic area, since June 1993 Bihać had been one of six United Nations Safe Areas established in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The US administration felt that its capture by Serb forces would intensify the war and lead a humanitarian disaster greater in scale than any other of the war to that point. Amongst the United States, France and the United Kingdom, there was division regarding how to protect the area. The US called for airstrikes against the VRS, but the French and the British opposed them citing safety concerns and a desire to maintain the neutrality of French and British troops deployed as a part of the UNPROFOR to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In turn, the US was unwilling to commit ground troops. On the other hand, the Europeans recognized that the US was free to propose military confrontation with the Serbs while relying on the European powers to block any such move, as French President François Mitterrand discouraged any military intervention, greatly helping the Serb war effort. The French stance reversed after Jacques Chirac was elected president of France in May 1995, pressuring the British to adopt a more aggressive approach as well. Denying Bihać to the Serbs was also strategically important to Croatia, and General Janko Bobetko, the Chief of the Croatian General Staff, considered the potential fall of Bihać to represent an end to Croatia's war effort.

In March 1994, the Washington Agreement was signed, ending the Croat–Bosniak War, and providing Croatia with US military advisors from the Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI). The US involvement reflected a new military strategy endorsed by Bill Clinton in February 1993. Because the UN arms embargo was still in place, the MPRI was hired ostensibly to prepare the HV for participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace programme. They trained HV officers and personnel for 14 weeks from January to April 1995. It has also been speculated in several sources, including an article in The New York Times by Leslie Wayne and various Serbian media reports, that the MPRI may also have provided doctrinal advice, scenario planning and US government satellite intelligence to Croatia, although MPRI, American and Croatian officials have denied such claims. In November 1994, the United States unilaterally ended the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in effect allowing the HV to supply itself as arms shipments flowed through Croatia.

The Washington Agreement also resulted in a series of meetings between Croatian and US government and military officials held in Zagreb and Washington, D.C. On 29 November 1994, the Croatian representatives proposed to attack Serb-held territory from Livno in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to draw off a part of the force besieging Bihać and to prevent its capture by the Serbs. As the US officials gave no response to the proposal, the Croatian General Staff ordered Operation Winter '94 the same day, to be carried out by the HV and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO)—the main military force of the Bosnian Croats. Besides contributing to the defence of Bihać, the attack shifted the line of contact of the HV and the HVO closer to the supply routes of the RSK.

On 17 July, the RSK and the VRS militaries started a fresh effort, codenamed Operation Sword-95, to capture Bihać by expanding on gains made during Operation Spider. The move provided the HV with a chance to extend their territorial gains from Operation Winter '94 by advancing from the Livno valley. On 22 July, Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and the Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegović, signed Split Agreement on mutual defence, permitting the large-scale deployment of the HV in Bosnia and Herzegovina.