Operation Michael - The British and German Lines Before The Battle

The British and German Lines Before The Battle

In early 1918, replying to this kind of attack posed many problems for the BEF. In the British lines morale was at a low point. The slaughter of the First Battle of the Somme, the atrocious conditions of Passchendaele and the disappointment of the counter-attack wiping out the early successes at Cambrai had all taken their toll in both manpower and morale. Britain had now been at war for over three years. The troops were sick and tired of monotonous rations and boredom in the trenches and sick to death with shell shock, mud and trench foot. The only major German offensive on the Western Front since the second Battle of Ypres in 1915 was against the French at Verdun, giving the British commanders little experience in defense. The successful development of a deep defense system of trench lines by the Germans during 1917 had led the British to adopt this new and unfamiliar system. Defence in depth required three lines: a front line, a battle zone and redoubt line and a rear line (though "zone" is probably a better description than "line"). The front line or "outpost zone" (later renamed the "forward zone") was backed up by the "battle zone", where an offensive was to be firmly resisted, and behind this was the "rear zone", where reserves were held ready to counter-attack or seal off penetrations. This reduced the proportion of troops in the front line, which was lightly held by snipers, patrols and machine-gun posts only, and in theory pulled reserves and supply dumps back beyond German artillery range. A British infantry division (with nine infantry battalions) deployed three battalions in the outpost zone, four battalions in the battle zone and two battalions in the rear zone.

The Germans chose to attack the sector around St Quentin taken over by the British in April following the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line in the Spring of 1917. The British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, had agreed to take over this area at the Boulogne Conference, against military advice, after which the British line was extended. In reality, this "line", taken over from the French, barely existed, needing many man-hours of construction work to make it easily defendable. Unfortunately, sufficient man power was not available.

Germany had begun construction of the Siegfried Stellung (as they called that part of the Hindenburg Line) in September 1916, during the battle of the Somme. It stretched from the Channel to the Moselle River. Over 300 mi (480 km) long, designed by Col von Lossberg and built by Belgian and Russian prisoners, its strongest section was the salient at St. Quentin between Arras and Soissons. The line was the ultimate in “defence in depth” trench building. It was 1 mi (1.6 km) deep with barbed wire in zig-zag lines of 50 ft (15 m), protecting three lines, of trenches, interconnecting tunnels and strong points. In the rear were deep underground bunkers known as "stollen" (galleries) — holding reserves for a counter-attack — and the artillery was hidden on the reverse slopes of the line. The Germans withdrew to this line in an operation codenamed Alberich over five weeks during which time German High Command ordered a Scorched earth policy, and the ground abandoned in the retreat was laid waste, wells were poisoned, booby-trapped souvenirs were left behind, and villages such as Bapaume destroyed. During the winter of 1917–1918, the new British line was established in an arc around St Quentin by many small unit actions among the ruined villages in the area. This line differed from the rest of the British front as the line of trenches was not complete. There were many isolated outposts, gaps in the line and large areas of disputed territory and waste land. These positions were slowly improved by attempting to implement (despite the manpower shortages) the new three-zone tactic of defence in depth. The 1/1st Hertfordshire war diary, along with many other war diaries of battalions in the area, shows that the battalion was engaged in 'working parties' for much of January, February, and March, but while most of the redoubts in the battle zone were complete by March 1918, the rear zone was still under construction.

To add to these woes, the British Army had undergone a drastic reorganization to cope with the manpower shortages. A British infantry division was now nine battalions strong, reduced from four battalions to three per brigade. It had been laid down that the senior (regular and first-line territorial) were to be retained in preference to the higher-numbered second-line territorial and New Army battalions. Consequently, second-line territorial and New Army division were badly disrupted, having in some cases to disband half of their battalions to make way for units transferred from regular or first-line territorial divisions. Given that some battalions — normally 1,000 men strong — were down to below 500 men due to battle losses and sickness during the cold winter months, the new defences were not only difficult to construct, but where built, they were then undermanned.

The attacking armies were spread along a 43 mi (69 km) front between Arras, St. Quentin and La Fère. Ludendorff had assembled a force of 74 divisions, 6,600 artillery pieces, 3,500 mortars and 326 fighter aircraft, which were split between Otto von Below’s Seventeenth Army, Georg von der Marwitz’s Second Army, both of which were part of the Army Group commanded by Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, and General Oskar von Hutier's Eighteenth Army, (part of the Army Group commanded by Crown Prince Wilhelm) and the Seventh Army. The main weight of attack was between Arras and a few miles south of St-Quentin. Von Hutier's Eighteenth Army, headquartered at Guise, boasted 27 Divisions. The average strength of a German Division in 1918 stood at 12,300 men, 3,000 horses, 48 artillery pieces, 120 mortars, 78 heavy machine guns, 144 light machine guns, and 6–12 trucks.

In the north, two German armies would attack either side of the Flesquières salient, created during the battle of Cambrai. The Eighteenth Army, fresh from the Eastern Front, planned its attack on each side of St. Quentin, aiming to sever British lines and divide the British and French armies. The two northern armies would then attack the British position around Arras before advancing north-west, to cut off the BEF in Flanders. In the south, it was intended to reach the Somme, and then hold the line of the river against any French counterattacks. During the planning process, the southern advance was extended to include an advance across the Somme. The success of this southern advance would badly unbalance the entire offensive.

This attack fell on two British armies. In the north was General Julian Byng’s Third Army defending the area from Arras south to the Flesquieres salient. To the south was General Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army which held the line down to Barisis and the junction with the French. Byng had commanded the Canadian troops who took Vimy Ridge and his Third Army was at the Battle of Cambrai, while Gough had commanded the Reserve Army (renamed the Fifth Army in October 1916) which had been present during the infamous 1st day of the Battle of the Somme on 1 July 1916. His army was the weaker of the two. It consisted of 12 Divisions, 1,650 guns, and 119 tanks, and 357 aircraft. An average British division in 1918 consisted of 11,800 men, 3670 horses and mules, 48 artillery pieces, 36 mortars, 64 Vickers heavy machine guns, 144 Lewis light machine guns, 770 carts and wagons, 360 motorcycles and bicycles, 14 trucks and cars, and 21 motorized ambulances.

By mid-March 1918, British intelligence was sure that a German offensive was coming. Allied aircraft had successfully photographed German preparations behind their lines. New supply roads had been constructed and shell craters had been turned into concealed trench mortar batteries. Heavily laden motorized and horse-drawn transports had been seen heading into St. Quentin from the east, and in the distance German officers were observed studying British lines. The British answer was increased nightly bombardment of the German front lines, rear areas, and possible areas of troop assembly.

A few days before the attack, two German deserters wanting to avoid the coming offensive slipped through No Man's Land and surrendered to the 107th Brigade. They spoke of troops, batteries of artillery and trench mortars massing on the German front. They reported 100 mortars directly in front of 36th Division lines for the purpose of cutting their wire and an artillery bombardment, lasting several hours, as a preliminary to an infantry assault. A number of other German prisoners had already been taken, which had provided valuable information to XVIII Corps Headquarters, resulting in scaled up preparations for the offensive. The 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary describes their activities from 18–20 March as being intensive training during daylight hours with specialist training in the evening. During the night of 20 March, troops of the 61st Division launched a raid on German positions and took more prisoners who told them that the offensive would be launched the following morning. The British reacted upon the information gained from the 61st Division's prisoners but their commanders had completely underestimated what was awaiting them, the answer was merely to order a bombardment of German lines and likely areas of assembly for attack between 02:30 and 03:00. Before this began, however, the Germans had already started their own barrage.

The British Command knew that the preparations for Ludendorff's Spring Offensive were now in their final hours with the sector held by Fifth Army still unfamiliar, badly organised terrain. It had defences which were not completed and there were too few troops to properly hold the position 'in depth'. The rear zone existed as outline markings only, and the battle zone consisted of battalion "redoubts" that were not mutually supporting (allowing stormtroopers to penetrate between them). In addition Gough’s army contained a large number of reorganised divisions. For the British, unused to a discontinuous line and the idea of deep zone defended strongholds, Ludendorff's attack would require heroism in the face of chaos and confusion to avoid disaster.