Operation Marne Torch - Marne Torch I

Marne Torch I

As part of the much vaunted "troop surge" in the summer of 2007, MND-C initiated Operation Marne Torch I on 15 June 2007. Consisting of both kinetic and non-kinetic operations, Marne Torch I was launched to establish a security presence on both sides of the Tigris River valley, an area that had not seen a large coalition presence and was under insurgent control. According to MND-C Commander Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch the operation sought specifically to "block accelerants of violence into Baghdad, secure the population and defeat sectarian violence." Lynch said "Accelerants are defined as anything -- insurgents, weapons, materiel, IEDs, VBIEDs, ideology, anything -- that, left uncontrolled, would affect the security in Baghdad." While being intelligence-driven, Marne Torch had three primary characteristics:

• Speed - Coalition ground units would secure insurgent-held areas and quickly transition to a hold strategy.
• Violence - The insurgency would be struck efficiently and with overwhelming firepower, on the ground and from the air.
• Engagement - US and Iraqi forces would solicit cooperation from the populace by restoring and improving the local infrastructure.

During this phase, more than 1,100 structures were cleared, 83 insurgents killed, and more than 850 citizens were entered into a biometric identification system. However, Coalition forces failed to transition to a holding strategy as the insurgent network proved too entrenched and Iraqi security forces too immature.

American air power was used extensively during Marne Torch I. During the operation more than 70 air strikes were conducted, including attacks by US Air Force B-1B bomber and F-16C strike aircraft, as well as US Navy F/A-18E Hornets. The new XM982 Excalibur satellite-guided artillery round was also utilized with particularly devastating effect, targeting insurgent leaders hiding among the local populace. One example of this particular weapon system being effectively employed, in conjunction with fluid coordination between other American air support assets, occurred on 14 July.

Coalition forces received intelligence reports that Al-Qaeda in Iraq cell leader Abu Jurah and 14 insurgents were meeting at a house in Arab Jabour. The cell was reported to be responsible for IED, VBIED, and indirect fire attacks on Coalition forces. Predicated upon this belief, American commanders went after Jurah with a vengeance. At 1312 zulu time, the meeting house was positively identified. Two XM982 Excalibur rounds were fired from a M109 Paladin 155mm battery based at Camp Falcon and placed on the house, destroying it. A Predator UAV orbiting overhead observed personnel leaving the rubble of the meeting house, loading wounded persons in to a sedan and driving away. An AH-64 Apache helicopter gunship arrived over the area and promptly destroyed the sedan. Three more personnel were observed running from the remnants of the meeting house into a nearby structure.

A US Air Force F-16 reported on station and dropped two 500-pound GPS-guided bombs on the structure. A bomb damage assessment confirmed Jurah's death.

Soldiers on the ground also had the advantage of ubiquitous OH-58D Kiowas patrolling the sky, providing near-instantaneous visual reconnaissance and fire support. The 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade which operated the Kiowas was responsible for over 70% of insurgent casualties

On 2 July an insurgent leader on the most wanted list was captured in Arab Jabour.

In mid-July, MND-C transitioned to Operation Marne Avalanche