Operation Anaconda - Background

Background

In early 2002 increasing signals and human intelligence indicated a strong presence of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in the Shahi-Kot Valley. Approximately 150 to 200 fighters were believed to be wintering and possibly preparing for a spring offensive in the valley. The signal intelligence also raised the possibility that high-value targets (HVTs) were present in the valley among which were Jalaluddin Haqqani and Saif Rahman. In late January and February plans were drawn up to assault the Shahi-Kot Valley using Afghan military forces (AMF) advised and assisted by U.S. special operators. Major General Franklin L. "Buster" Hagenback was put in command of the operation. The plan called for an attack on the valley, along with units positioned in the mountains to the east to prevent escape into Pakistan. The expectation was that fighters, as in the case of Tora Bora several months earlier, would flee in the face of an assault and that blocker groups would simply be able to round them up.

It was decided to use U.S. conventional infantry. The forces used, consisting of the 187th Infantry Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division ("Rakkasans"), led by Colonel Frank Wiercinski, and soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul LaCamera, to secure these blocking positions. In keeping with established strategy in Afghanistan, fire support was to be provided by United States Air Force units, rather than artillery. Further air support was provided by US Navy units and French Air Force Mirage 2000Ds. The amount of conventional assets allowed in Afghanistan was limited by CENTCOM and civilian defense leadership. The final plan foresaw two major forces: TF Hammer and TF Anvil. TF Hammer consisted of AMF and special operators as the primary effort to assault the Shahi-Kot Valley. TF Anvil consisted of TF Rakkasan and the 1-87 to set up blocking positions and prevent enemy forces from escaping. Special operations teams from the Advanced Force Operations (AFO) detachment led by Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber were to provide on-location reconnaissance in the Shahi-Kot Valley for the operation.

The Afghans had successfully defeated the Soviet Army twice in this valley, and were expecting events to pan out in a similar fashion.