Nuclear Peace - The Nuclear Peace Argument

The Nuclear Peace Argument

A nuclear peace results when the costs of war are unacceptably high for both sides. In a two-sided conflict where both sides have mutual second-strike capability, defense becomes impossible. Thus, it is the very prospect of fighting the war rather than the possibility of losing it that induces restraint.

In a condition of mutual assured destruction, there are civilian “hostages” on both sides. This facilitates cooperation by acting as an informal mechanism of contract enforcement between states. There are economic equivalents of such informal mechanisms used to effect credible commitment - for example, corporations use hostages (in the form of initial setup costs that act as collateral) to deter subsidiaries and franchisees from cheating.

Nuclear weapons may also lessen a state's reliance on allies for security, thus preventing allies from dragging each other into wars (a phenomenon known as chainganging, frequently said to be a major cause of World War I).

Since the death of civilians is an essential part of mutually assured destruction, one normative consequence of nuclear weapons is that war loses its historical function as a symbol of glory and measure of national strength.

As a method of preventing a destabilizing arms race, the concept of Minimal deterrence represents one way of solving the security dilemma and avoiding an arms race.

A study published in the journal of conflict resolution in 2009 quantitatively evaluated the nuclear peace hypothesis, and found support for the existence of the Stability-instability paradox. The study determined that while nuclear weapons promote strategic stability, and prevent large scale wars, they simultaneously allow for more lower intensity conflicts. When a nuclear monopoly exists between two states, and their opponent does not, there is a greater chance of war. In contrast, when there is mutual nuclear weapon ownership with both states possessing nuclear weapons, the odds of war drop precipitously. According to the author:

Unlike conventional deterrence in previous eras, nuclear deterrence is extremely robust because even irrational or unintelligent leaders are likely to recognize the exceedingly high cost of nuclear war. Thus, proponents of nuclear deterrence claim with a high degree of confidence that “the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero”. Scholars who are critical of nuclear deterrence have generally avoided questioning whether nuclear weapons make war less likely. Instead, they usually take one of two approaches. “Safety critics” warn that the nuclear weapons pose a danger because of accidental detonations and inadvertent escalation. In contrast, “moral critics” argue that nuclear weapons should be eliminated because they violate international law, are immoral, or both. Oddly enough neither safety critics nor moral critics tend to question whether nuclear weapons deter war. To the contrary, ( the “safety critic” Scott Sagan) has assumed that nuclear weapons do indeed reduce the chance of conflict, but argue instead that their deterrent value is outweighed by safety concerns and the prospects of more proliferation.