Nortraship - New York - Internal Fighting

Internal Fighting

After the initial organisation of Nortraship was clear, the business perspective came into focus. Nortraship was the exiled Norwegian government's main source of income and while contributing to the war effort, had to be managed for the highest possible profit. The vessels that were ceded to the British were fixed and had subsidised rates; the remainder (the "free ships") were primarily sailing for the (still neutral) US at market rates.

When Norway was invaded, German consuls boarded Norwegian vessels in several US harbours, attempting to have them sail for Norway. The Norwegian consulate did its best to counter this, and in deliberation with Norway's ambassador in London, "The Norwegian Shipping Committee" in New York was established. Among the challenges was the crew problem; due to the agreement with the British wages had been reduced from 5 June 1940, while crews on the "free ships" enjoyed an increase. Nazis and communists tried to demoralize the crews and serious desertion problems were encountered, resulting in ships lying idle for months.

Meanwhile, in London the British were hard pressed with France on the verge of defeat. Within Nortraship the view was gaining ground that it was inexcusable not to have an adequate office in New York. In spite of resistance from the Norwegian ambassador, it was decided on 21 May 1940 to send a Nortraship delegation to New York4, the reasons being both security in case of a German invasion, and commercial: many Nortraship vessels called at US ports. The British Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, was informed of the decision on 24 May 1940; the Foreign Ministry were reluctant but had to accept it.

The delegation arrived in New York on 11 June 1940 and started working with the already established committee, the main issues being organisation and the freight earnings from the "free ships"; until then they had been kept by the shipowners (or their US representatives). This resulted in a revolt by the Norwegian shipping professionals in New York; they basically demanded the status quo. As the situation became critical, Øivind Lorentzen decided to travel to New York to sort it out. He arrived on 5 July 1940 and after a meeting with the interim committee it was dissolved on 15 July 1940, thus paving the way for the establishment of Nortraship's New York office, which was located at 80 Broad Street, Manhattan.

Øivind Lorentzen had only planned for a brief visit in New York, and in his absence Ingolf Hysing Olsen, Norwegian representative in Britain for the Norwegian Shipowners Association, was acting head in London. Thus new friction was created, as the leaders of the two main Nortraship offices did not cooperate well. It was so severe that the Minister of Supply and Shipping, Trygve Lie, had to forward it to the government for a formal resolution. On 25 October the Norwegian government stated that the two offices were "parallel enterprises, each working independently with its ships". This also resulted in a tally of ships; as of 21 November 1940 London administered 570 ships while New York had 282 (whaling ships not included).

Nortraship had a large fleet, and the expenses were considerable; a currency strategy was therefore necessary.. It was formulated by Arne Sunde (who later would become Minister of Shipping) on 1 August 1940 and stated that expenses should be paid with Sterling currencies, and use of US dollars was to be avoided. The reason for this was both the current currency situation and the anticipated situation after the war.

In the autumn of 1940 Nortraship New York still had problems with "free ships", most urgently those owned by Fred. Olsen. The shipowner Thomas Olsen, residing in New York, insisted on managing them and argued that as the owner he was in the best position to do so. He was cautioned by Øivind Lorentzen, to no avail, and after Olsen wrote a letter to the government Trygve Lie commented that Olsen's behaviour was "the kind that bordered on high treason"5. Olsen was not alone in his scepticism regarding Nortraship, and on 18 February 1941 The Norwegian Shipowners' Conference in America was established to secure Norwegian shipowners' interests outside Norway. Part of the scepticism was founded on the Norwegian government being Labour and thus possibly contemplating nationalisation of the shipping companies after the war. The Prime Minister rejected this suggestion, and in a cable in March 1941 he promised that all ships would be handed back to their owners as soon as possible when the war was over.

The internal quarrels were still not settled, partly due to Øivind Lorentzen also having ships managed contrary to Nortraship policy, in the Nopal line led by his son Per A. Lorentzen (later head of Nortraship's New York charter department). This was partly corrected after pressure from the London office in August 1940, but it damanged Lorentzen's position as head of Nortraship and was a recurring theme for his critics. One of the sternest opponents of Lorentzen was Hilmar Reksten, a maverick shipowner who had himself been in the spotlight for bending the Nortraship rules.