National People's Army - History

History

The National People’s Army was created on March 1, 1956, six months after the formation of the West German Bundeswehr, from the Kasernierte Volkspolizei (Barracked People's Police). It was preceded by years of preparation during which former Wehrmacht officers and Communist veterans of the Spanish Civil War helped organize and train paramilitary units of the People's Police. With its German appearance—including uniforms and ceremonies patterned after older German military traditions—the doctrine and structure of the NVA were strongly influenced by the Soviet Armed Forces, thus mixing elements of the 20th century's most innovative and successful schools of military in a force which, for its size, was considered one of the most professional and prepared of the world.

Former GDR Interior Minister Willi Stoph served as the first Minister of National Defense between 1956 and 1960. He was followed by Heinz Hoffmann, who was to serve in this capacity until his death in 1985. From its inception, the NVA became an army where professional officers were also expected to be SED cadres. Political officers charged with instruction of the troops on ideological, military, and global affairs formed an essential part of NVA daily routine (Politische Hauptverwaltung/Political Main Administration). By definition, the East German army served “the Party and the people” (“Parteiarmee”), and almost every active officer was a member of the SED. NVA structures took on a repressive and vindictive character against those in uniform who dared to dissent on matters deemed “political”.

During its first year, about 27 percent of the NVA's officer corps had formerly served in the Wehrmacht. Of the 82 highest command positions, 61 were held by ex-Wehrmacht officers. The military knowledge and combat experience of these veterans were indispensable in the NVA's early years, although by the 1960s most of these World War II veterans had been retired. The West German Bundeswehr similarly relied on Wehrmacht veterans who initially comprised the majority of its commissioned ranks.

In its first six years, the NVA was an all-volunteer force. West Germany, in contrast, re-introduced universal military service in 1956. Conscription was finally introduced in 1962, and the NVA's strength was increased to approximately 170,000 troops.

Like the Communist parties of other socialist states, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, or SED, assured control by appointing loyal party members to top positions and organizing intensive political education for all ranks. The proportion of SED members in the officer corps rose steadily after the early 1960s, eventually reaching almost 95 percent of the officer corps.

The NVA described itself as the instrument of power of the working class. According to its doctrine, the NVA protected peace and secured the achievements of socialism by maintaining a convincing deterrent to imperialist aggression. The NVA's motto, inscribed on its flag, was "For the Protection of the Workers' and Farmers' Power."

The NVA never took part in full-scale combat, although it participated in a support role in the suppression of the Prague Spring of 1968 and NVA officers often served as combat advisers in Africa. When the Soviet Union prepared to occupy Czechoslovakia, the GDR government originally planned to use the 7th Panzer Division and the 11th Motorized Infantry Division to support the intervention, but fear of international reaction to the deployment of German troops outside Germany for the first time since the Second World War caused second thoughts. Instead, the NVA provided logistical help when Soviet troops advanced into Czechoslovakia and stood at the border ready to intervene in the event that the Soviet Army could not quell the uprising.

During the 1970s, and increasingly in the 1980s, the NVA achieved new standards of mobilization times and combat readiness (Gefechtsbereitschaft). NATO’s submarine-based missiles were seen as its most potent weapon and the hardest to defend against. Ultimately, 85 per cent of all NVA units were on constant alert and trained to depart within 25 to 30 minutes from their bases to designated areas about five to seven kilometers apart. Mobilization of reserves would have been completed within two days. These unprecedented levels of combat readiness were considered the major asset of GDR military deterrence. Needless to say, such preparedness levels placed a huge strain on military professionals and conscripts alike.

In the early 1970s the NVA was assigned the wartime mission of capturing Berlin by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany high command. The NVA plan for the operation was designated 'Operation Centre' and called for some 32,000 troops in two divisions, accompanied by the GSFG's 6th Guards Separate Motor Rifle Brigade. The plan was regularly updated until 1988, when a less ambitious plan that simply aimed at containing Berlin was substituted.

In the autumn of 1981, the NVA stood ready to intervene in Poland in support of a possible Soviet invasion, but the declaration of martial law in Poland averted the crisis.

The NVA was in a state of heightened combat readiness on several occasions, including the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, and, for the last time, in the autumn of 1989 as protests swept through the country.

Read more about this topic:  National People's Army

Famous quotes containing the word history:

    Throughout the history of commercial life nobody has ever quite liked the commission man. His function is too vague, his presence always seems one too many, his profit looks too easy, and even when you admit that he has a necessary function, you feel that this function is, as it were, a personification of something that in an ethical society would not need to exist. If people could deal with one another honestly, they would not need agents.
    Raymond Chandler (1888–1959)

    The greatest honor history can bestow is that of peacemaker.
    Richard M. Nixon (1913–1995)

    The principle office of history I take to be this: to prevent virtuous actions from being forgotten, and that evil words and deeds should fear an infamous reputation with posterity.
    Tacitus (c. 55–117)