Michael Echanis - Nicaraguan Military Service

Nicaraguan Military Service

Echanis presented himself as a major while working in Nicaragua. He wore a U.S Special Forces "green beret" with the 5th SFG(A) "flash" and the insignia of a major in the U.S. Army. The beret was given to him in 1976 by Gary O'Neal to be worn during the final Special Forces Qualification exercise "Robin Sage". Echanis played the role of a guerrilla commander during these exercises. Echanis wearing this beret can be seen in the October 28, 1981 ABC Nightline Special about Echanis and his death in Nicaragua. The beret was one of only a handful of personal items returned to the Echanis family in late 1978 from Nicaragua. Echanis's penchant for ruthless action with little regard for collateral damage (civilians) became a serious concern for some in both the U.S. and Nicaraguan governments. His lack of formal military training and experience (going from a Specialist 4 in the United States Army with less than two years in service to appearing to be a former major in the U.S. military rankled a broad number of people who did not enjoy having to interact with him.

Historical inferences and allegations that Echanis and members of his team in Nicaragua were working for the CIA are in error. Although former Green Beret and Echanis' best friend Chuck Sanders had applied for a position with the intelligence agency he was advised by formal letter in March 1977 that no vacancies were available for him. Sanders later made a second unilateral contact with a self-identified recruiter for the CIA at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, regarding possible opportunities to assist the intelligence agency (http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1755&dat=19811210&id=YJ0cAAAAIBAJ&sjid=F2gEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6102,5472900), however Echanis scolded Sanders after the fact and rebuked then Master Sergeant Luke Thompson's several efforts to contact him to assist the CIA as being inappropriate and uninvited. The Deputy Charge of Mission (DCM) at the U.S. embassy told the extended staff to include Echanis and his team they would never be permitted to be used in such a capacity and the issue was settled in-house (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mauricio_Sola%C3%BAn). Mr. Thompson declined to comment on his discussions with Sanders/Echanis in 1981 and the CIA offered through its spokesperson at the time that it had nothing to offer, as well.

Echanis' perceived rank as a major is described by Somoza in his 1980 book co-written with Jack Cox, Nicaragua Betrayed. Describing the Sandinista take-over of the Nicaraguan Congress in August 1978 by the FSLN Somoza describes "General Jose Ivan Allegrett and Major Mike Echanis stormed out of my office in anger. They wanted to lead the charge. These military men were afraid of nothing. With twelve to fourteen men they were going to take the Palace and, you know, they would have done it...". Clearly then President Somoza did not know or care regarding Echanis' use of a major's rank to both intimidate or impress.

President Somoza would not sign off on such a fate for the estimated 1200 hostages the FSLN held at the Palace. Somoza's first cousin, Luis Pallais Debayle, was being held and had been wounded in the head when the 25 FSLN guerrillas assaulted the palace. He was on the phone with the US ambassador when Pastora's unit seized the Congress chamber. Also held was Jose Somoza Abrego, son of General Jose Somoza and nephew to the President. Somoza knew many of those at the palace and he knew their families. He knew the vast majority were everyday office workers and administrators. In his book he states the projected time of the assault itself - 18–20 minutes in duration - killed any further consideration of Echanis' plan. He would not have the blood of "300-400" people on his hands over a flawed military operation. In the end 59 convicted FSLN prisoners were released by the government and a half million dollar ransom was paid to the FSLN. Somoza, who graduated from the U.S. military academy at West Point in 1946 and had risen to the rank of General himself, well understood tactics, strategy, force and diplomacy to resolve delicate situations.

Echanis' anger was in part based on the FSLN's successful repulsion of he and his commandos at the onset of the take-over. Arriving at the front of the palace Echanis' truck-borne commandos on their way to a firing range were effectively engaged by FSLN guerrillas with one of Echanis' captains in the lead vehicle was killed outright. FSLN Commander Eden Pastora, a hero of the Sandinista revolution, advised President Somoza by telephone that if the counter attack continued he would begin killing hostages. "Echanis, in communication with the Bunker by radio, wanted to assault the palace before the guerrillas could get organized, but he was ordered to pull back". Echanis did not know the FSLN had already captured and confined the Congress and were ready to kill all of them had he not obeyed the orders coming from the Bunker.

The "Bunker" where President Somoza preferred to conduct his business from was roughly one mile south of the National Palace. It was not actually a bunker but an above ground complex. The National Palace housed the Congress (50 members) and the ministries of finance and the interior. Rage and emotion were driving Echanis' thought processes not clear, objective military thinking and planning. Eden Pastora's hand picked assault team were dressed in the distinct uniform and headgear of Echanis' "Black Berets". On August 22, 1978, Pastora's team gathered in the capital.

The National Palace incident was over o at 10:00 AM on August 24, 1978. Echanis would give his final interview to Tom Fenton at AP ten days later. During the interview Echanis claimed forces within the National Guard were planning to kill Alegrett and him because of their growing intelligence operations. Echanis insisted the interview not be published unless he was killed. This interview, one of three over a period of several weeks, was incendiary in its content and embarrassing to the United States Government as well as to President Somoza.