Median Voter Theorem - Limitations

Limitations

The median voter theorem has several limitations. Keith Krehbiel postulates that there are many factors which cause the political process from reaching efficiency. Just like transaction costs prevent efficiency in market exchanges, things in the majoritarian voting process inhibit it from reaching optimality. With the median voter theorem in particular, Krehbiel argues that voters' inability to directly amend legislation inhibits the theorem from holding true. Sometimes, as Krehbiel writes, the policies being voted on are too complex to be placed within a one-dimensional continuum. Buchanan and Tollison also note that this is a problem for median voter theorem, which assumes that decisions can be made on a one-dimensional field. If voters are considering more than one issue simultaneously, the median voter theorem is inapplicable. This may happen if, for example, voters may vote on a referendum regarding education spending and police spending simultaneously.

A larger problem for the median voter theorem, however, is the problem of the incentives structure for government representatives. Downs, in “A Theory of Bureaucracy,” writes that people's decisions are motivated by self-interest, an idea deeply rooted in the writings of Adam Smith. This holds for the government system as well, because it is composed of individuals who are self-interested. One cannot guarantee the degree to which a government representative will be committed to the public good, but it is certain that, to some degree, they will be committed to their own set of goals. These goals can include a desire to serve the public interest, but most often they include the desire for power, income, and prestige. To continue obtaining these things, then, officials must secure their re-election to office. When representatives are constantly focused on becoming re-elected, this distorts the orders they receive from their constituents; representatives will interpret what their constituents want into benefits for themselves. They will tend to vote for short-run policies that will aid in getting them re-elected.