LOT Flight 7 - Sequence of Events

Sequence of Events

Finally, when the control pushers were found to be cut in half, it was proven that the cut was not caused by the crash, and some traces of the metal alloy the turbine disc was made of was found on the surface of the cut, the sequence of events became clear. The disaster started when "Kopernik" was instructed to climb to a higher flight level. When the necessary thrust was applied to all four engines, the low-pressure turbine of the number 2 engine disintegrated explosively after 9 seconds. One piece of the turbine disc got ejected upwards, not causing any significant damage; the second piece shot into the engine number 1, damaging it seriously; finally, the third piece of the disc shot into the hull, severed the rudder and elevator control pushers and destroyed the number 3 engine, causing loss of control over the plane; it also severed power cables for both the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder. This caused the last moments of "Kopernik" not to be recorded.

The cut control pushers also explained the sudden steep dive. When they were cut, the horizontal stabilizer, under its own weight, dropped down, causing the nose also to go down. This could be counteracted by the vertical trim; in Il-62s, the switch setting the vertical trim to manual operation was secured by a thin, sharp wire. On Capt. Lipowczan's right hand, small wounds were found, and they were confirmed to be made while Lipowczan was still alive; supposedly, he ripped the security off and tried to control the vertical trim, but it was too late.

In an interview for Polish TV series The Black Series, Capt. Tomasz Smolicz, an experienced airline pilot who flew thousands of hours on transatlantic routes on Ilyushins Il-62 and Il-62M in the 1970s and 1980s (he flew "Kopernik" from Warsaw to New York on 13 March 1980), stated that the planes returning to Warsaw from America usually landed on runway course 155 (155 degrees, south-south-east), and if they landed at or before noon on a sunny day (such as on 14 March 1980), the sun was shining almost directly in their eyes, which were weary after several hours of night flight and constant monitoring of cockpit instruments; this sometimes caused disorientation and confusion if an indicator light actually was lit or not; so, on that day, the landing gear indicator could have actually been lit, but the crew members might have managed to see it incorrectly. During the recovery, the landing gear was found to be properly extended and locked.