Loan Modification in The United States - United States 2000s

United States 2000s

According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) chairman, Sheila C. Bair, looking back as far as the 1980s, "the FDIC applied workout procedures for troubled loans out of bank failures, modifying loans to make them affordable and to turn nonperforming into performing loans."

The U.S. housing boom of the first few years of the 21st century ended abruptly in 2006. Housing starts, which peaked at more than 2 million units in 2005, plummeted to just over half that level. Home prices, which were increasing at double-digit rates nationally in 2004 and 2005, have fallen dramatically since (see Chart 1). As home prices decline, the number of problem mortgages, particularly in sub-prime and Alt-A portfolios, is rising. As of third quarter 2007, the percentage of sub-prime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) that were seriously delinquent or in foreclosure reached 15.6 percent, more than double the level of a year ago (see Chart 2). The deterioration in credit performance began in the industrial Midwest, where economic conditions have been the weakest, but has now (2006–2007) spread to the former boom markets of Florida, California, and other coastal states.

Chart 1

Chart 2

During 2007, investors and ratings agencies have repeatedly downgraded assumptions about sub-prime credit performance. A Merrill Lynch study published in July estimated that if U.S. home prices fell only 5 percent, subprime credit losses to investors would total just under $150 billion, and Alt-A credit losses would total $25 billion. On the heels of this report came news that the S&P/Case-Shiller Composite Home Price Index for 10 large U.S. cities had fallen in August to a level that was already 5 percent lower than a year ago, with the likelihood of a similar decline over the coming year.

The complexity of many mortgage-backed securitization structures has heightened the overall risk aversion of investors, resulting in what has become a broader illiquidity in global credit markets. These disruptions have led to a precipitous decline in sub-prime lending, a significant reduction in the availability of Alt-A loans, and higher interest rates on jumbo loans (see Chart 3). The tightening in mortgage credit has placed further downward pressure on home sales and home prices, a situation that now could derail the U.S. economic expansion.

Chart 3

Residential mortgage credit quality continues to weaken, with both delinquencies and charge-offs on the rise at FDIC-insured institutions.

This trend, in tandem with upward pricing of hybrid adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) loans, falling home prices, and fewer refinancing options, underscores the urgency of finding a workable solution to current problems in the sub-prime mortgage market. Legislators, regulators, bankers, mortgage servicers, and consumer groups have been debating the merits of strategies that may help preserve home ownership, minimize foreclosures, and restore some stability to local housing markets.

On December 6, 2007, an industry-led plan was announced to help avert foreclosure for certain sub-prime homeowners who face unaffordable payments when their interest rates reset. This plan provides for a streamlined process to extend the starter rates on sub-prime ARMs for at least five years in cases where borrowers remain current on their loans but cannot refinance or afford the higher payments after reset. An important component of the industry-led plan is detailed reporting of loan modification activity. Working with the United States Treasury Department and other bank regulators, the FDIC will monitor loan modification levels and seek adjustments to the protocols if warranted.